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Abstract
This paper hopes to provide an American Pragmatist reading of the Effective Altruism philosophy and
movement. The criticism levied against Effective Altruism here begins from one of its founding principles, and
extends to practical aspects of the movement. The utilitarian leaders of Effective Altruism consider Sidgwick’s
‘point of view of the universe’ an objective starting point of determining ethics. Using Quality Adjusted Life
Years (QALYs), a popular measure in contemporary welfare economics, they provide a “universal currency for
misery” for evaluating decisions. Through this method, one can calculate exactly the value of each moral
decision by identifying which one yields more QALYs, and, apparently, objectively come to a conclusion
about the moral worth of seemingly unrelated situations, for example, whether it is more moral to donate
money so as to help women suffering from painful childbirth-induced fistulas, or to donate to starving
children in famine-ridden areas. What’s more, not making the choice that yields more QALYs is “unfair” to
those one could have helped more, thus immoral.
This paper provides, first a pragmatist conception of epistemology (or lack of it), in contrast to the
Sidgwickian one held by the utilitarian effective altruists, and then explores how holding either
epistemological position affects our ethical viewpoints and actions. It argues that the utilitarian conception is
the wrong place, and way, from which to view all ethical action. It contends that Effective Altruism, in seeking
to reorder society to meet its abstractly conceived teleological utilitarian moral ideal (as measured by QALYs-
a measure settled upon by the movement’s leaders), is undemocratic, and ultimately misses much of the
complexity and messiness provided by contingencies, personal and cultural, that is present in, and important
to, human life. Altruism done this way is atomizing and thoughtless; and it depicts to a high degree what
William James referred to as a “certain blindness in human beings” - the lack of recognition that different
things matter to different people, and that it is impossible to aggregate these claims relative to a moral standard
that exists outside their particular individual and societal experiences.
The paper then provides a pragmatist reading of meliorism, as found in the works of John Dewey, William
James, Richard Rorty and Jane Addams; a view of meliorism that hearkens towards solidarity and not
objectivity; one that is not only democratic, cognizant of contingencies and focused on habit, but also, by its
insistence on viewing ourselves as members of communities and societies, saves us from the moral
atomization of Effective Altruism and its insistence on individual moral responsibility and action in line with
“objective truths”, as opposed to collective and political action to address contingent issues.
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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper hopes to provide an American Pragmatist reading of the Effective Altruism 
philosophy and movement. The criticism levied against Effective Altruism here begins from 
one of its founding principles, and extends to practical aspects of the movement. The 
utilitarian leaders of Effective Altruism consider Sidgwick’s ‘point of view of the universe’ 
an objective starting point of determining ethics. Using Quality Adjusted Life Years 
(QALYs), a popular measure in contemporary welfare economics, they provide a “universal 
currency for misery”  for evaluating decisions. Through this method, one can calculate 1
exactly the value of each moral decision by identifying which one yields more QALYs, and, 
apparently, objectively come to a conclusion about the moral worth of seemingly unrelated 
situations, for example, whether it is more moral to donate money so as to help women 
suffering from painful childbirth-induced fistulas, or to donate to starving children in 
famine-ridden areas . What’s more, not making the choice that yields more QALYs is 2
“unfair”  to those one could have helped more, thus immoral.  3
1 Srinivasan, Amia. (2015). “Stop the Robot Apocalypse”. Review of “Doing Good Better: How 
Effective Altruism can Help you help Others, Do work that Matters, and Make Smarter Choices about 
Giving Back” by William MacAskill. London Review of Books. 
 
2 MacAskill speaking about his visit to Hamlin Fistula Hospital in Ethiopia: “​When I’d visited Ethiopia 
several years before, I’d visited this hospital. ​I’d hugged the women who suffered from this condition, 
and they’d thanked me for visiting them. It had been an important experience for me: a vivid first-hand 
demonstration of the severity of the problems in the world. This was a cause I had a personal 
connection with. Should I have donated to the Fistula Foundation, even knowing I could do more to 
help people if I donated elsewhere? I do not think so. If I were to give to the Fistula Foundation rather 
than to charities I thought were more effective, I would be privileging the needs of some people over 
others for emotional rather than moral reasons. That would be unfair to those I could have helped 
more. If I’d visited some other shelter in Ethiopia, or in any other country, I would have had a different 
set of personal connections. It was arbitrary that I’d seen this particular problem at close quarters​.” 
DGB, pg. 41. 
 
3 MacAskill, William. (2015). Doing Good Better, pg. 42  
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This paper provides, first a pragmatist conception of epistemology (or lack of it), in 
contrast to the Sidgwickian one held by the utilitarian effective altruists, and then explores 
how holding either epistemological position affects our ethical viewpoints and actions. It 
argues that the utilitarian conception is the wrong place, and way, from which to view all 
ethical action. It contends that Effective Altruism, in seeking to reorder society to meet its 
abstractly conceived teleological utilitarian moral ideal (as measured by QALYs- a measure 
settled upon by the movement’s leaders), is undemocratic, and ultimately misses much of the 
complexity and messiness provided by contingencies, personal and cultural, that is present in, 
and important to, human life. Altruism done this way is atomizing and thoughtless; and it 
depicts to a high degree what William James referred to as a “certain blindness in human 
beings”  - the lack of recognition that different things matter to different people, and that it is 4
impossible to aggregate these claims relative to a moral standard that exists outside their 
particular individual and societal experiences.  
 
The paper then provides a pragmatist reading of meliorism, as found in the works of 
John Dewey, William James, Richard Rorty and Jane Addams; a view of meliorism that 
hearkens towards solidarity and not objectivity; one that is not only democratic, cognizant of 
contingencies and focused on habit, but also, by its insistence on viewing ourselves as 
members of communities and societies, saves us from the moral atomization of Effective 
Altruism and its insistence on individual moral responsibility and action in line with 
“objective truths”, as opposed to collective and political action to address contingent issues.  
4 James, William. (1899). On a Certain Blindness in Human Beings. Penguin 
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INTRODUCTION 
Philosophy is often accused of not being engaged with the world; of being conducted 
from the “armchair”, such that the questions it troubles itself with have more to do with 
abstract theorizing than with the actual lived lives of human beings. This thesis is, first and 
foremost then, an exploration of two philosophies - Effective Altruism and American 
Pragmatism- that repudiate this contention; that actively involve themselves in meliorism - 
engagement with the world in a bid to improve it.  
 
Much more importantly, however, this thesis discusses how these philosophical 
movements go about their work. In doing this, it presents a critique against the Effective 
Altruism philosophy and movement, beginning from its epistemological framework (the meta 
theory about knowledge that grounds it) and extending to its practical aspects. Conversely, 
the thesis champions the methodological anti-epistemological framework of the American 
Pragmatists, and argues that this framework leads to much better practical consequences. 
 
The primary material informing this thesis comprised, on the one hand; books, journal 
articles, newspaper & magazine essays and profiles, YouTube videos & other online 
resources, and correspondence with members of the Effective Altruism movement and 
philosophy, as well as some engagement with older texts on utilitarianism that provided the 
grounding epistemological framework for Effective Altruism. On the other hand, I made use 
of books, articles and encyclopedia entries that dealt with the American Pragmatist school of 
philosophy, with particular emphasis on the works of John Dewey - whose papers I accessed 
through Southern Illinois University, William James, Jane Addams, Richard Rorty and 
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Charles Sanders-Peirce. I also read many books on related non-philosophical topics, 
particularly in development and welfare economics, social choice theory, history, and 
sociology. 
 
The thesis is structured as a series of three extended essays meant to be read together. 
The first essay, ​Objectivity, Contingency, Solidarity​ provides an overview of the 
epistemological debates grounding both schools of philosophy discussed here. On the one 
hand, Henry Sidgwick’s utilitarian “Point of view of the Universe” which undergirds 
Effective Altruism. This view holds that any notion of “good”, and therefore of meliorism, is 
to be understood as being grounded on an objective truth - arrived at from an impartial and 
maximizing point of view. The view thus presents a universal currency, one of utility, under 
which any melioristic program can be measured against. If we have two issues that we care 
about, then this view demands that we subject them to this maximization test, and the one that 
maximizes becomes the one that we are rationally and ethically compelled to adopt or 
champion.  
 
On the other hand, pragmatist anti-epistemology. By this view there is no such thing 
as an objective, metaphysical truth. Truth, rather, is a human creation that enables us to attain 
certain preferable states and consequences in the world. By this view, attempts at meliorism 
should not refer back to an immaterial objective truth - as Sidgwick does, but should instead 
seek to engender democratic consensus and solidarity about how to best tackle the problems 
we face in the world. 
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The second essay, ​Shall We Leave it to The Experts​, explores what I consider to be the 
flaws of Effective Altruism, based on its adoption of Sidgwick’s epistemology. I argue 
extensively that Effective Altruism’s adoption of objectivity promotes moral heedlessness - 
by promoting moral “experts” ; that it does not engage sufficiently with systemic and 
structural change; and, as with all utilitarian philosophies, that it demands too much, morally, 
from us. 
 
The third essay, ​Democratic Vistas​, explores how meliorism might look like if we are 
to adopt the (anti) epistemological framework of the American Pragmatists as opposed to that 
of the utilitarians. It sets forth a democratic, contingent, and pliable account of improving the 
world; one that insists on political solidarity as the framework for meliorism, as opposed to 
one that appeals to objectivity.  
 
The conclusion of the thesis urges that we turn away from epistemological accounts 
of objectivity, and instead to political accounts of solidarity as the grounding for our 
engagement with the world; to, in our melioristic endeavors, ask the political question - “what 
are the consequences of this?” as opposed to the epistemological question - “what is this?” 
Doing this, I argue, results in better practical consequences in the world, and in a philosophy 
that is truly engaged. 
 
This thesis was generously funded by a fellowship from the Wolf Humanities Center, 
and by a grant from the Benjamin Franklin Scholars Program through the Center for 
Undergraduate Research and Fellowships (CURF). 
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PART ONE 
 OBJECTIVITY, CONTINGENCY, SUBJECTIVITY 
 
There’s some peculiar in each leaf and grain, 
Some unmark’d fiber, or some varying vein, 
Shall only man be taken in the gross? 
Grant but as many sorts of mind as moss. 
 
Alexander Pope, Epistle 1 to Richard Temple, Viscount Cobham. 
Published. 1734. 
 
In his work, ​The Method of Ethics​, the Victorian philosopher Henry Sidgwick 
undertook a remarkable defense of utilitarianism. Sidgwick sought to provide what he 
deemed the correct way of, “obtaining reasoned convictions as to what ​ought  to be done” . 5 6
Pleasure, he thought, was the only thing that was “intrinsically good”. Ethical conduct, he 
held, was therefore “objectively right” when its principal consideration was what would 
“​produce the greatest amount of happiness on the whole; that is, taking into account all whose 
happiness is affectd by the conduct” . Despite its “cumbrousness”, Sidgwick referred to this 7
principle as “Universalistic Hedonism”  8
 
5 My emphasis 
6 Sidgwick, Henry., 1874, “The Method of Ethics”.​ London: Macmillan and Co. 1874 
7 Ibid (Book 4 Chapter 1). 
8 Ibid 7 
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But of course objective universalistic hedonism could not be arrived at subjectively. 
We humans are beings with different, many times conflicting, points of views, interests, 
allegiances, and so on. Moreover, we invariably tend to unfairly attach more weight to our 
own interests, and to those of our loved ones, as compared to those of strangers and others far 
from us. This, naturally, could not count, Sidgwick believed, as what we ​ought​ to do. Many 
times, actions carried out in this way would surely not produce the greatest amount of 
happiness on the whole.  
 
Furthermore, he strongly believed, the good of one being, no matter who they were to 
us,​ not even when they were us ourselves​, was not more important, ​ethically​ speaking, than 
the good of another. Sidgwick therefore, unlike his utilitarian predecessor - John Stuart Mill, 
was not willing to simply leave matters at the “harm principle”  - that our actions be limited 9
only when they harmed others, which is to say, that we had a negative duty not to cause harm 
to others. Sidgwick extended this, believing that we had a positive duty to ensure that utility 
was evenly and impartially distributed- beneficence as the balancing of the moral books. 
 
The recourse was therefore to approach ethical action from the point of view of a 
neutral observer - and neutral in this sense could not mean just any third party “human 
person’. For despite our wonderfully human capabilities for rationality, our inclinations 
9 It is interesting to note that some pragmatist appropriate Mill or claim him as one of their own. 
William James, for example, dedicates his book, “Pragmatism”, to Mill - “​To the memory of John 
Stuart Mill, from whom I first learned the pragmatic openness of mind, and whom my fancy likes to 
picture as our leader were he here today​”. Rorty, in page 63 of Contingency, Irony and Solidarity, 
while briefly discussing the harm principle, says, “J​. S. Mill's suggestion that governments devote 
themselves to optimizing the balance between leaving people's private lives alone and preventing 
suffering seems to me pretty much the last word​”. 
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towards justice; we were all by virtue of our humanity, knowingly or unknowingly, either 
contaminated by allegiance, or simply ignorant of what was ‘truly good’. Instead of this 
inherent subjectivity, Sidgwick called upon us to imagine what a truly reasonable, perfectly 
neutral, observing entity - neutral insofar as they were, of course, impartial, but also very 
importantly, maximizing- would hold. And this was supposed to be the viewpoint we were 
ethically and rationally compelled to adopt. Sidgwick termed this the “point of view of the 
universe”. 
 
This view has long since dominated the utilitarian school. According to it, like 
Gradgrind’s fact pitchers , we are supposed to think of ourselves simply as containers for 10
utility. In a detached way therefore, what it means to do good and to be good, is to 
redistribute that utility as impartially and as efficiently as possible so as to be maximizing. 
The view has influenced the work of philosophers with a utilitarian bent into areas of inquiry 
outside philosophical ethics (though obviously with deep implications within ethical theory). 
For example, in philosophy of mind, Derek Parfit, a highly influential utilitarian philosopher, 
very much influenced by Sidgwick, wrote a brilliant account, exploring issues such as the 
unity of consciousness and brain bisection, to argue why personal identity does not matter , 11
which is to say, why the particular contingencies of individual life do not matter. The 
corollary in ethics to this question in the philosophy of mind is obvious (even if it may be 
10 See: Dickens, Charles. (1854). “Hard Times for these Times”. London: Chapman & Hall. Here, 
Dickens parodies Thomas Gradgrind, the utilitarian headmaster of a school - who has also named all 
his children after famous utilitarians, including Thomas Malthus. Gradgrind insists that the students in 
his school learn only “useful” knowledge - “facts, facts, facts”. Gradgrind conceives of the children as 
nothing more than repositories for these facts. 
 
11 Parfit, Derek. 1984. “Reasons and Persons”. Chapter 12: “Why our Identity is not What Matters”. 
Oxford University Press. 
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argued that the connection I draw here is tenuous): If individual personal identity, the starting 
point of all subjectivity, does not matter, how could ethical viewpoints arising from it?  12
What matters, in both mind and ethics, these accounts hold, is something above and beyond, 
something objective. 
 
Other contemporary utilitarians, too, seem to have doubled down on Sidgwick. Peter 
Singer and Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek in their book “​The Point of View of the Universe: 
Sidgwick and Contemporary Ethics​” as well as in other works , advance several arguments 13
on disparate issues, for example the evolutionary basis for moral judgements; whether 
preference utilitarianism is preferable to hedonistic utilitarianism; the call for universal 
beneficence - and its demandingness, and many other issues of the like. The central 
foundation upon which the arguments of these contemporary utilitarians lie is this idea that 
Sidgwick’s point of view of the universe is the correct standpoint from which to view these 
ethical issues.  
 
Non-utilitarian philosophers have also explored the question of an objective point of 
view. Thomas Nagel, famously a Kantian, in his temperate exposition of ethical viewpoints, 
outlined a contrast. The first: A “view from nowhere” , a supposedly objective “place” 14
(which is “nowhere in particular, really” ) where the only valuable insights are ones reached 15
12 ​The pragmatists I discuss here do not deny the existence of this contingency. But they diverge from 
the utilitarians in that they think this contingency does matter. In fact, they assert that it matters so 
much that anything prescribing an objective view over and above it is ridiculous 
 
13 De Lazari-Radek, Katarzyna., Singer, Peter. (2012). “The Objectivity of Ethics and the Unity of 
Practical Reason”.  Ethics , Vol. 123, No. 1 (October 2012), pp. 9-31 
 
14 Nagel, Thomas. 1986., “The View from Nowhere”.:  
15 Ibid page 14 
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“independently” - which is to say - detached from any individual perspective. Insofar as there 
is a world of things, contends Nagel, there is an objective standpoint from where we can view 
that world over and above our interests and experiences; an objective perspective of world 
qua​ world.  
 
The second: a subjective view, the stuff of everyday individualized experiences, 
drawn from consciousness - joy, taste, pain, color perception, love, passion, etcetera. We 
consciously feel and perceive things, consciously have experiences of this second kind, but 
the best we can do is to analogize them for others - I feel pain in this way, other feeling 
beings are like me ​qua​ feeling, so they must feel pain in this way too. But, Nagel holds, we 
can never objectively understand the “stuff” of these subjective experiences; it is the realm of 
qualia​. What is it like to be a bat?  How do scrambled eggs taste to a cockroach? - It is not 16 17
solipsism, for we do not deny that other minds exist, and that other beings think and feel; it is 
instead a case of epistemic inadequacy, one not acknowledged by physicalist theories in 
philosophy of mind when attempting to explain consciousness.  
 
There is such a thing, Nagel thinks, as phenomenal experience; ​what it is like​ to be a 
particular conscious being. And try as we might, we cannot objectively detail the exact 
substance of these subjective experiences. In this sense, we cannot have a “point of view of 
the universe” about these issues. What this would mean, Nagel’s account implies, would be 
that a good theory of ethics, like a good theory of mind, would need to take into account the 
16 Nagel, Thomas, 1974. “What is it like to be a bat?” ​The Philosophical Review, October 1974 
17 Ibid 16 
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existence of this subjectivity. This, of course, is not to say that a good ethical theory needs to 
be relativistic; that is far from what Nagel means. 
 
Nagel’s solution is to not prefer one viewpoint over another. For him, objectivity can 
never completely override inherent subjectivity, or vice versa. Instead, he concludes that both 
views, subjective and objective, must learn to coexist alongside one another; that though this 
is a difficult balance, it is what we must nevertheless consistently aspire to . For Nagel, we 18
must somehow learn to juggle the demands of both viewpoints. We must be careful that the 
call of the subjective affect does not entirely relieve us from the demands of the ‘objective’ 
ethical. But we must also guard that we are not puritanical with ethical objectivity at the cost 
of all subjectivity, that we maintain a level of recognition for the inherent subjectiveness of 
human perspectives and experiences.  
 
This solution is deeply honest, even if not satisfying. Nagel is not simply interested in 
us being good by “doing good” i.e. maximizing utility, as the utilitarians would have it. He 
also acknowledges our basic individuated humanity, and is interested in us being good in a 
subjective sense; as conscious individual beings, with thoughts and feelings and desires that 
are unique; with experiences that are non-generalizable and deeply personally meaningful. 
Here Kantianism and other non-consequentialist philosophies provide a refreshing reprieve 
from the ‘demandingness’  of utilitarianism.  19
18 Williams, Bernard. 1986. “A Passion for the Beyond”. ​Review of “The View from Nowhere” by 
Thomas Nagel. London Review of Books. Vol. 8, No. 14. 7 August 1986. 
 
19 The word demandingness is placed in quotes since its use here may be contentious. The way the 
word is usually used, as regards to utilitarianism, involves the idea that following the logic of 
consequentialism, some actions we typically deem to be supererogatory (praiseworthy but not 
obligatory) become obligatory. For example, if we are to be persuaded by argument that it is morally 
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Nevertheless, this is not the view of the pragmatist school, which is the main focus of 
this work, and which shall substantively be outlined within the course of this essay.  
 
American Pragmatism has a tenuous relationship with epistemology - something that 
Cornel West called an “evasion”  of Philosophy. Pragmatists reject the idea, seen as the goal 20
of philosophy since Plato, of philosophy as proceeding towards truth; of the task of 
epistemology being the ​discovery​ of a certain knowledge about the world. Typically, many 
philosophers think of the world, and of morality, as an already formed analytical unit, with its 
own rules and ways of working- ways of working that we come to discover through science, 
philosophy, and other forms of inquiry , and then live correctly with respect to.  21
 
For the pragmatists, however, the world and things in it exist, sure, and human beings, 
like other animals, exist in the world too. But that is it. There is no inherent sense of right or 
required of us, not just that it would be praiseworthy, to donate a certain amount of our income to 
charity. The effect is that we may then reject what the argument requires of us, even though we have 
accepted the argument itself, because the argument so violates our intuitions and our usual way of 
doing things. The way I use the word ‘demandingness’ here at the very least complicates the relation 
of superogation/ obligation behind it. I hearken to a distinction made by Nagel; that of agent-neutrality 
and agent-relativity. Agent-neutral situations are the parallels to Nagel’s view of what is “objective”, as 
in, it applies indiscriminately for everyone: “everybody, generally speaking, has a reason to want pain 
to stop, even if it is not his pain” - that is an ‘objective’ standpoint from which we can view pain. The 
agent-relative situation, on the other hand, would apply only to particular individuals, for example, “I 
want to graduate in May, so I must stay in school”. Nobody else really cares if ​I​ don’t graduate in May, 
though. Agent-relative situations, like agent-neutral situations, have degrees of importance, and these 
agent situations cannot be mapped onto each other one to one. If an agent-relative situation would 
seem to me, in my judgement, to require much more of my attention and resources than an 
agent-neutral one, contends Nagel, then in his view, it is not immoral to choose the agent-relative 
situation. This complicates the idea of the demandingness objection.  
 
20 West, Cornel. (1989). “The American Evasion of Philosophy: A Genealogy of Pragmatism”. 
University of Wisconsin Press. 
 
21 This conception of epistemology, as Elizabeth Anscombe suggested, makes sense if one believes 
in intelligent design, yet many philosophers who reject intelligent design, Peter Singer for example, 
still hold on to this view of epistemology. 
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wrong, true or false, that exists in the world ​before​ conscious subjects give it meaning - and 
this happens through language. It is not that the ​qualia​ Nagel mentions constitute a subjective 
truth of some sort that is unknowable because of epistemic inadequacy, or that, in the same 
vein, there are objective truths that are knowable through epistemology. It is, rather, that there 
are no truths outside of the experiences and linguistic structures of human beings; no 
teleogized ideals. Pragmatists deny epistemology in its entirety - they do not have one, much 
less a relativistic one. Philosophy, the pragmatists think, should thus reorient its goals from a 
search for truth, to an attempt to understand the products of the interactions of human habits 
and impulses which produce social and moral conditions.  
 
John Dewey says on this: 
 
“​When it is acknowledged that under the disguise of dealing with ultimate reality, 
philosophy has been occupied with the precious values embedded in social traditions, that it 
has sprung from a clash of social ends and from a conflict of inherited institutions with 
incompatible contemporary tendencies, it will be seen that the task of future philosophy is to 
clarify men’s ideas as to the social and moral strife of their own day. Its aim is to become, as 
far as is humanly possible an organ for dealing with these conflicts​”  22
 
  There is thus a third way that pragmatism offers in this tussle between teleogized 
essentialism and abject relativism: the recognition of contingency. Contingency is certainly 
not objectivity, but it is also ​not ​subjectivity in the relativistic sense - it is not a trivialism 
22 Quotation lifted from: West, Cornell. (1989). The American Evasion of Philosophy: A Genealogy of 
Pragmatism. Chapter 4; pg. 112. 
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which renders us incapable of action because all possible choices are of equal merit . 23
Contingency, rather, is the predication of some things/events on other things/events, such that 
we realize that things could be (or could have been) otherwise, that the world is always 
presenting us with new information to challenge any beliefs we hold, and therefore that no 
beliefs stand on absolute solid ground. But at the same time, it is the recognition of the fact 
that within the world as it is now, there are intersubjective agreements (obviously not 
universal) on how certain things are, or should be, in order to best serve present purposes, and 
that for practical reasons, if one were to try to assert claims of subjectivity upon certain 
agreements within certain communities, one would not be taken seriously.  
 
The result of this is an acknowledgment that the truths we hold now are not inherent 
or  immutable, they are changeable, but that it is useful to hold them - even to advocate 
strongly for them - because they serve particular ​present​ purposes for ​us​. When doubt arises 
in us about the value of these truths, an acknowledgement of contingency calls on us to assess 
practicable results, to make any changes we do on the basis of these potential results (while 
acknowledging their contingency), not to instead refer to some objectivity that exists outside 
of ourselves, as the determining factor in judging which truths we should then adopt; nor to 
throw up our hands and relativistically, hopelessly, claim it is all the same. At the center of 
this acknowledgement of contingency however, must always be democratic experience. 
Changes made must always be agreed upon by the broadest group of people they will affect, 
and not instigated by coercion, nor accepted purely on authority. 
 
23 ​Wieland, J. W. (2012) Can Pyrrhonists act normally? Philosophical Explorations: An International 
Journal for the Philosophy of Mind and Action 15(3):277-289. 
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For example, Carlin Romano  in his discussion of Richard Rorty’s work, gives the 24
example of the sentence “Beijing is the capital city of China”. This “fact” is rooted in our 
language and shared intersubjective agreement, such that if today someone were to say that 
“Shenzhen is the capital city of China”, we would think him “objectively” wrong. This 
person could not reasonably say that it was his “subjective” opinion that Shenzhen is the 
capital city of China; that that was what was true ​to him​. This supposed ‘objectivity’ in 
Beijing being China’s capital, however, is not a function of the world. There is nothing 
inherent in Beijing that necessitates that it is the capital of China, and if tomorrow the 
government of China decided to make Shenzhen the capital, we would quickly update our 
language and ways of behaviour. “Shenzhen is the capital city of China” would be the new 
“objective” fact.  
 
But these “facts” , as I have been arguing, are contingent on our intersubjective 
agreement; they are not facts from nowhere, independent of us. If a critical mass of us 
continued acting as if Beijing were still the capital city of China, then the government of 
China might have a problem on its hands, and for practicable reasons, might be forced to 
redesignate Beijing as China’s capital.  
 
In other terms, an acknowledgement of contingency would mean a “stuttering 
conviction”, as Alexander Livingston suggests from his reading of William James. Stuttering 
convictions are unlike both relativism and absolutism; they are “at once principled and 
24 Romano, Carlin. Carlin. (2017). “America the Philosophical”. Chapter on “Rorty’s Revolution”. Pg. 
126-160. Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group. 
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reflective, held passionately but not blindly” - which is to say that they enable us to act in the 25
world, to act on our convictions, but to be open enough to revising them in the face of new 
evidence. 
 
 This is only possible when we reorient ourselves not to think teleologically. When we 
change our convictions in the face of new evidence, that is not to say that the convictions we 
previously held were “wrong” and the ones we now hold are “right”. Rather, it it is to say that 
those convictions served our purposes best​ then​, and these other ones do so now - perhaps 
because we have come across new information, or perhaps because we have expanded the 
boundaries of who we consider “us” to be. When we attempt to convince others to adopt our 
convictions similarly, the idea is not that our convictions have a better relation to an objective 
impartial immaterial criterion of truth than theirs. Rather, what we are trying to do is to have 
them join us in our intersubjective community of agreement, with the knowledge that this 
broader community of agreement makes practicable action in the world easier, and of more 
use to everyone involved. 
 
The pragmatists therefore do not accept Nagel’s objective “view from nowhere”. 
They do not deny that we could agree on how to view particular scenarios, as argued above; 
that we could have a shared language for speaking about particular experiences of and in the 
world. What they ​do​ deny, is that there could be such a thing as “objectivity” existing over 
and above human beings and their activities; a neutral arbiter out in the world that balances 
the activities of human beings in terms of absolute wrongs and rights. Both Dewey and James 
25 Livingston, Alexander. (2016). Damn Great Empires!: William James and the Politics of 
Pragmatism. Pg. 106.  
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disapprove of the “quest for certainty” which they see mainstream philosophy to be engaged 
in. For James, the existence of objective truth is “just one more subjective opinion which one 
can add to their list of other subjective opinions” .  26
 
For Richard Rorty who perhaps does the most work in outlining contingency, 
language is contingent; selfhood is contingent, and the assertion of an objective “truth” in any 
domain is simply a failure to recognize this contingency. For him, as for Dewey and James, 
there are no essences, no grander truths out there; and we do not discover or realize truths or 
meaning out in the world, or through some Mathematical process: we create it as it serves our 
purposes, and we discard it when it stops doing so. Rorty thinks that only propositions 
developed in sentences - which are parts of vocabularies developed by human beings- could 
be true or false. Things in the world cannot be true or false; things in the world just are.  
 
Because propositions and sentences and languages are human creations, and because 
only propositions can be true or false, it serves that “truth” too is a human creation. The more 
interesting question to ask of something in the world, therefore, is not whether it is real, or 
true/ false, but rather, “What use is it?”  In this sense, the notion that oxygen, and not 27
phlogiston, was responsible for combustion, as Johann Becher convinced the European 
scientific world of the 17th century, or that black people are ‘equal’ to white people (Rorty’s 
example)  which has now come to be accepted by all non-racists as an immutable “fact”, was 28
26 James, William. (1896). The Will to Believe. 
 
27 See, Romano, Carlin. (2017). “America the Philosophical”. Chapter on “Rorty’s Revolution”. Pg. 
126-160. Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group. 
 
28 Rorty, Contingency, Irony, Solidarity - Pg. 77 
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not an objective fact we came to “discover”. Rather, it was simply a new vocabulary we came 
to adopt because it came to serve our purposes better, or, as in the case of slavery, because we 
(“we” here being initially white Americans) expanded our notions of who “we” were (to 
include blacks) .  29
 
This notion of being trapped within our linguistics and ethno-cultural contexts too, is 
the idea of Deweyan Pragmatic Instrumentalism: that “real objects are nothing but the things 
it pays for ​us​ to have names for in certain schemes of interactions” .  30
 
Rorty says on this: 
 
For pragmatists, the desire for objectivity is not the desire to escape the limitations of 
one's community, but simply the desire for as much intersubjective agreement as possible, the 
desire to extend the reference of "us" as far as we can. Insofar as pragmatists make a 
distinction between knowledge and opinion, it is simply the dis​tinction between topics on 
which such agreement is relatively easy to get and topics on which agreement is relatively 
hard to get . 31
 
This then is a pragmatic acknowledgment of the contingency of the relationship in 
which we stand to the world. The assumption people like the utilitarians, and to an extent 
29 This presents an interesting discussion when we consider issues involving what we deem the 
ethical treatment of animals. What would expanding the “we” to include animals look like? How do we 
do this outside a metaphysical and epistemological grounding of something shared? 
30 Glaude, Eddie. (20007). “In the Shade of Blue”. Pg. 63. 
31 Rorty, Richard. (1998). Achieving Our Country: Leftist Thought in Twentieth Century America. 
Harvard University Press. Pg 169 
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Nagel, make when they make claims about “objectivity” is to think that there is, as Rorty 
says, such a relation of “fitting the world or being faithful to the true nature of the self in 
which language might stand in relation to non-language. This assumption goes hand in hand 
with the assumption that “our language” is somehow … a unity, a third thing which stands in 
some determinate relation with two other unities, the self and reality . If we think of 32
language as contingent, and therefore do not conceive of it as a “medium” for representation 
of the world to the self; if we do not think that there are “non-linguistic things called 
‘meanings’ which it is the task of language to express, and non-linguistic entities called 
‘facts’ which it is the task of language to represent”, then we cannot possibly have a “view 
from nowhere” . 33
 
This essay weaves these themes of contingency, subjectivity and objectivity 
throughout their discussion of how the Effective Altruism movement has marshalled the idea 
of an “objective” moral truth to present its core claims. The sleight of hand here is that once 
the idea of an “objective truth” and the teleology following from it is accepted, then action 
begins to be judged relative to this abstraction, and any notion of democracy in determining 
ethical action is thus deemed unnecessary, even wasteful. One then hears concepts of 
“immorality” invoked, to refer to ideas and actions which diverge from this teleogized 
objectivity. 
 
32 Rorty, Richard. (1989). Contingency, Irony, Solidarity. Cambridge University Press (Pg. 13.) 
 
33 For more clarification see chapter 1 of Contingency, Irony and Solidarity. “The Contingency of 
Language”. 
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 The subsequent parts of the essay assess Sidgwick’s idea of the point of view of 
universe with respect to beneficence - our duty to aid, and with specific regards to the 
contemporary Effective Altruism movement. The essay then contrasts the idea of the point of 
view of the universe with a different account provided by the American pragmatist 
philosophers, mainly John Dewey, William James, Richard Rorty, and Jane Addams. It 
outlines Dewey’s criticism of teleological -ultimate end- philosophy, rejecting, as Dewey 
does, any ​a priori​ “fixed reference point outside of conduct” .  34
 
This essay does not go as far as proposing a detailed, practical pragmatist program for 
beneficence, especially the kind of beneficence that the Effective Altruists are involved in. 
Many philosophers have developed rich accounts for conceptualizing such issues, the ones 
that readily come to mind being the Capabilities Approach championed by Amartya Sen  and 35
Martha Nussbaum , and some approaches which attempt to extend Rawlsian principles of 36
justice to international societies, for example those presented by Thomas Pogge .  Even 37
though I may periodically refer to some of these approaches and sometimes even critique 
34 See:  Dewey, John., 1922. “Human Nature and Conduct: An Introduction to Social Psychology” 
Chapter 1. Henry Holt and Company; New York. 
 
35 Sen, Amartya. (2001). “Development as Freedom”. Oxford University Press. 
Sen, Amartya. (1992).”Inequality Re-examined”. Russell-Sage Foundation 
Sen, Amartya. (1985). “Commodities and Capabilities”. Elsevier Publishing 
 
36 Nussbaum, Martha. (2006). “Frontiers of Justice: Disability, Nationality, Species Membership”. 
Belknap Press/Harvard University. 
Nussbaum, Martha. (2011). “Creating Capabilities: The Human Development Approach”. Belknap 
Press/Harvard University. 
 
37 Pogge, Thomas. (1989). “Realizing Rawls”. Cornell University Press. 
Pogge, Thomas. (2008). “World Poverty and Human Rights: Cosmopolitan Responsibilities and 
Reforms”. Polity. 
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them briefly, the scope of these works is beyond me, and my goals are altogether much more 
humble. 
 
 Indeed Pragmatism cannot provide such an account - for such an account is 
independent of contingency. To say that this is what pragmatism thinks beneficence should 
look like is to fall into the same trap of asserting supposed objectivity. All Pragmatism can do 
is to recommend that we abandon all teleology, that we consistently doubt our beliefs, that we 
make use of every available evidence; that our beliefs be developed with regards to human 
action and not abstractly. In this way, Pragmatism presents “less a doctrine than a manner of 
orienting oneself towards a world of competing and conflicting moral ideals” . Yet in taking 38
up this orientation, our actions and their consequences would look remarkably different, and 
that has important implications for the consequences of our beneficent actions.  
 
It is, of course, of importance to note that the work the Effective Altruists are 
involved with is timely and necessary. And it is also important to note that with the arguable 
exception of Kantianism and Aristotelian Virtue Ethics, no other school of thought has 
contributed to moral philosophy as much as utilitarianism. This then is not a critique of 
everything utilitarian, or of all (even most) of what Effective Altruism stands for. Indeed, 
both Deweyan pragmatism, of which I am a strong believer, and utilitarianism are, typically, 
in intention, ameliorating. Quite rightly too, many influential philosophers within the 
Effective Altruism movement have pointed out that to a large extent, the issues that the 
movement concerns itself with - matters concerning urgent and great human (and animal) 
38 Livingston, Alexander. (2016). Damn Great Empires!: William James and the Politics of 
Pragmatism. Pg. 111. Quote originally derived from James’s essay “The Moral Philosopher and the 
Moral Life”. 
May 2018, Wolf Humanities Center Undergraduate Research Fellowship 
John Aggrey Odera, College of Arts & Sciences, 2019, University of Pennsylvania 
25 
 
suffering, issues like widespread famines, deaths from preventable diseases, factory farming; 
and matters concerning grander questions of species survival, like climate change and 
‘technological singularity ’- can be addressed .  39 40
 
To this effect the core claim of the Effective Altruism movement is a simple and 
relatively non-controversial one - one that underlies pragmatism itself: that “evidence and 
reason should be used to benefit others as much as possible, and that action should be taken 
on that basis” . It does not matter to a starving person that we are pragmatists, utilitarians or 41
deontologists. I believe this is correct. Furthermore, As William MacAskill eloquently puts it, 
“Applying data and rationality to a charitable endeavor does not rob the act of virtue” . 42
 
 Indeed, a lot of money, and other resources, is wasted, whether it is by charities 
which spend inordinate amounts on costs such as high employee salaries as opposed to 
spending on achieving their core missions, or charities whose methods simply are mediocre at 
accomplishing the results they hope for. All charities are not created equal (based, of course, 
on fungible criteria that we agree on), and we should not be resistant to information that 
enlightens us to which charities work better than others based on these criteria. As I have 
39 For more on technological singularity - and its connection with the Effective Altruism Movement - 
see : Bostrom, Nick. 2014. “Superintelligence: Paths, Dangers, Strategies”. Oxford University Press. 
 
40 Parfit, Derek. 2015. “Reasons, Persons and Effective Altruism”. ​Talk delivered at Harvard 
University​. 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=q6glXJ7dVU0  
 
41 MacAskill, William. 2017. “Effective Altruism: Introduction”. ​Essays in Philosophy, Volume 18, Issue 
1, Article 1. Pg. 2-5. Jan. 2017​. 
 
42 MacAskill, William. (2015). “Doing Good Better: How Effective Altruism Can Help You Help Others, 
Do Work that Matters, and Make Smarter Choices about Giving Back”. Penguin Random House. 
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argued, Effective Altruism in this sense; in its insistence on evidence and intelligent 
reflection, in its meliorating push, is remarkably pragmatic. 
 
Still, the ways we evaluate this evidence, what it comes to mean to us, matter. And 
this is the critique that is provided in this essay. The turn from seeking consensus and using 
science and technology to create more desirable outcomes, all while acknowledging 
contingency, to instead asserting the objectivity of some claim, and then using this as the 
reference point for everything, as the Effective Altruists have done, is what I argue against 
here.  
 
The claims of Effective Altruism are not just restricted to which charities are most 
effective based on some agreed upon criteria. They not only go ahead to decide which criteria 
to be used - and cloak this in objectivity- but they then also go as far as making claims about 
which causes are “objectively” more effective, which careers one should go into, and so on. 
They also go on, from their perch of objectivity, to make comparisons between issues of such 
wide disparities, for example, as noted in the abstract, ​whether it is ​more​ moral to donate 
money so as to help women suffering from painful childbirth-induced fistulas, or to donate to 
starving children in famine-ridden areas.  
 
These subsequent issues raise many questions, for not only do they then have 
implications on what kinds of life we are to live - and who should determine these, they also 43
43 80,000 Hours, an organization affiliated to Effective Altruism, acknowledges that this (80,000 hours) 
is the average amount of time the average person spends working. They thus provide advising 
services on which careers people should go into to maximize their social impact (as measured by 
QALYs, of course). 
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raise important questions about whether we can meaningfully aggregate and analyze different 
issues such as the ones exemplified above, from a removed, supposedly objective, point of 
view, and, importantly, whether charity donations by individuals are the best means of 
approaching these issues. Like recruits to the military, following Effective Altruism means 
we would defer to the movement’s leaders to tell us what actions to take, which issues ​should 
matter, what careers to pursue. 
 
 Philosophy, done this way, then turns from an actual engagement with life in all its 
complexity and messiness, to a process of calculation; of figuring out how best to achieve 
“objective” ideals and teleologies. We would not only rid our lives of exploration and 
experimentation, of wonderful “non-moral” things and endeavors that are important in our 
lives ,but more significantly, we would be cogs in the ethical machine of Effective Altruism, 44
constantly waiting for the calculations to be done so we can adjust our lives accordingly. I 
sincerely believe moral philosophy has more to offer than this. 
 
 Negative philosophy of the kind I hope to undertake here is therefore necessary, even 
in matters like these. It does matter to our own lives and to the lives of others the 
philosophical lenses through which we view the world; these determine which actions we 
take and how. The undemocratic sleight of hand that the utilitarian leaders of Effective 
Altruism are attempting here - “these issues are very important, you admit, therefore, yield 
the ethical realm of determining what the “right” way of addressing them is to us, the ethical 
experts. Do as we say, and using our methods. We (and QALYs) know better” - this assertion 
44 See: Wolf, Susan. 1982. “Moral Saints”. The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 79, No. 8 (Aug., 1982), pp. 
419-439 
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of objectivity, which has deep implications to our lives as well as to the lives of those we 
seek to aid, cannot simply be accepted just because the issues we are thinking about are so 
serious. 
 
My hope is therefore that a close reading of pragmatist philosophy, by offering a 
mode of orientation, a methodological maxim based on actual consequences (“Consider what 
effects, that might have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. 
Then our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object” ), will help 45
us with exploring how we can both maintain a democratic conception of ethical good that 
acknowledges contingencies, and still hope to address pertinent problems in the world today. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(The second part of this essay delves deeply into the claims made by the effective altruism 
movement, and discusses what I think is wrong with the movement) 
45  Peirce, Charles Sanders. 1878. “How to Make Our Ideas Clear”. ​Popular Science Monthly, Volume 
12, 1878​. This is commonly known as the “pragmatic maxim”. 
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PART TWO: 
SHALL WE LEAVE IT TO THE EXPERTS?  
 
 ​It is so easy for the good and powerful to think that they can rise by following the 
dictates of conscience, by pursuing their own ideals, that they are prone to leave those ideals 
unconnected with the consent of their fellow-men 
Jane Addams  
 
 
Martha Nussbaum’s review  of Peter Unger’s book  is strongly disapproving. 46 47
Unger’s argument, in line with Peter Singer’s famous essay , ​Famine, Affluence and 48
Morality​, concerns the notion that affluent people, especially in western countries, are 
culpable in increased human misery. The key reason for this claim, for Unger as well as for 
Singer, is a distinction that many affluent people seem to have made between causing harm 
and allowing harm to occur. Unger argues that this distinction is irrelevant, and in typical 
consequentialist fashion, that what matters is that harm occurs - and those who allow it to 
occur are not in any way less morally culpable than those who commit it. 
 
46 Nussbaum, Martha. (1996). “If Oxfam Ran the World”. Published in “Philosophical Interventions: 
Reviews 1986 - 2011”. 
 
47 Unger, Peter. (1996). “Living High and Letting Die: Our Illusion of Innocence”. Oxford University 
Press. 
48 Singer, Peter. (1972). “Famine, Affluence and Morality”. Philosophy and Public Affairs. Vol. 1, No.3. 
(Spring 1972). 229 - 243. 
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 Unger gives here Singer’s famous example of a child drowning in a pond to illustrate 
his point . We are morally obligated to save the child, he affirms, so long as doing so does 49
not cause us anything morally comparable. And we are morally obligated to do so even if 
other people around us are not doing so. Therefore, drawing the analogy back to global 
poverty and deprivation, affluent people have a moral duty to mitigate the harm and suffering 
caused by global deprivation. To this effect, Unger argues that an affluent person “like you 
and me, must contribute to vitally effective groups, like Oxfam and Unicef, most of the 
money and property she now has, and most of what comes her way for the foreseeable 
future”   50
 
Unger’s account is already a difficult one on its own merits, for it is one whose 
intuitive appeal is shared usually by only consequentialists, and not by adherents to many 
other philosophical schools. One could simply deny the charge that causing harm is morally 
equivalent to allowing harm to occur . And having rejected this basic premise, it is difficult 51
to see how the consequentialist would proceed. But Nussbaum further misrepresents -or 
49 In Singer’s famous thought experiment, one is headed towards something important, say, a job - or 
to give a lecture. On the way there, one sees a child drowning in a pond. If one jumps and saves the 
drowning child, one will run into several inconveniences: one might be late to work or lecture, one 
might ruin one’s expensive clothing etc. Singer then asks, would one jump in to save the child despite 
knowing that one would ruin one’s clothing? Most people answer, yes. Singer then asks a follow up 
question: Would one fail to jump into the pond - and thereby let the child die - simply because other 
people around were not jumping in to save the child? - Most people, from intuition, say, no. Here, 
Singer draws out a principle that he thinks underlies these intuitions. We think it is morally wrong, he 
affirms, to let someone die if we can do something to save them without sacrificing something morally 
comparable (as in the clothes, or being late for work), and we think this still holds even if other people 
are not doing anything to save them. Singer then extends this to discuss our obligations concerning 
moral beneficence. 
 
50 Quote lifted from Nussbaum’s review and not from Unger. 
 
51 The only way to deny this is by an appeal to intuition, but I believe that the only way to assert it is 
also by appealing to shared intuition. 
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misunderstands- Unger’s argument, constructing a hypothetical dystopia - a morally 
diminished world where Unger’s suggestion is taken literally, and therefore charity 
organizations like OXFAM and UNICEF run the world. This, for her, means that democracy 
would be threatened, that “poverty and misery would almost certainly get much worse, as 
global health efforts fell into disarray, as the “green revolution” stalled for lack of intellectual 
input, and as debates about different types of economic organisation languished for lack of 
financial support”.   52
 
In providing this argument, Nussbaum ignores the obvious implication of Unger’s 
argument, which Peter Singer (and Unger himself) points out in the comments section of her 
piece: that since what Unger aims to do is to change the contingent world, the world to which 
he aims is not a world in which his philosophy is necessary. Which is to say, that if enough 
people donated to these “effective organizations” such that they could better tackle and solve 
the problems we consider pertinent, then there would be no need for other people to keep 
donating , there would be no breakdown in global institutions or movements - neither 53
OXFAM nor UNICEF would rule the world. Thus Nussbaum’s apocalyptic prophecies are 
mostly irrelevant, for Unger’s argument is predicated on contingency, on the fact that not 
everyone is going to take his recommendation.  
 
Of course Nussbaum’s contention should not be thrown off so lightly. She is an 
institutionalist, and she justifiably wonders what would happen in a world where these aid 
52 Ibid 48 
 
53 Unless of course one subscribes to the defeatist belief that the world’s problems are unsolvable or 
cannot be tacked at all given our resources, which neither Unger nor Nussbaum does. 
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organizations had become so powerful but no longer necessary. Would we simply disband 
them? Would they allow that? Important as these questions she asks are, they are speculative 
in a way that is not helpful for guiding practical action in the contingent world. The only time 
we could know whether it was possible to disband a future very powerful OXFAM would be 
in the future when OXFAM was already powerful and needed disbanding.  
 
 
Moral Imbeciles and “Impact” 
 
But Nussbaum gets many other things right. Unger’s book is a direct ideological 
predecessor of the current Effective Altruism movement, and in her criticism of Unger, 
Nussbaum, in her typical incisiveness, points out another facet of Unger’s work, which it 
shares with Effective Altruism, and which is critical to my project here: the audience of 
Unger’s book. 
 
 She notes:  
 
“​His implied reader is a moral imbecile, an affluent person who repeatedly tosses 
appeals from charitable organisations into the wastepaper basket and heedlessly goes on 
living the high life. This imbecile is not already thinking about how to do good, and can be 
reached only by being bullied and hectored. Unger keeps giving us phone numbers and 
addresses of charities, on the apparent ​(​p.190​) ​assumption that we don’t know how to find 
them for ourselves. His sentences are full of slogans and capital letters (the View that Ethics 
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is Highly Demanding, or Pretty Cheaply Lessening Early Death). He writes as if trying to 
speak to someone who is not only obtuse but deaf. Even his examples presuppose moral 
heedlessness​”  54
 
Indeed, according to the leaders of Effective Altruism, even though they themselves 
are utilitarian, one need not be utilitarian to be an Effective Altruist. In fact, one need not 
subscribe to ​any​ philosophical school of thought at all. All one need be interested in, is how 
to do good, and Effective Altruism will show you how to “do good better” - Much like what 
Nussbaum is accusing Unger of doing in the paragraph above. Which is to say, you don’t 
have to be a utilitarian if all that is required of you is to do what the utilitarians tell you.  
 
The idea put forward by the Effective Altruists then, to support Unger’s claim 
regarding our moral duty to donate, is that people living in the west , at this moment in time, 55
are at the “top of the heap”. “If you earn ​more than $52,000 per year, then, speaking globally, 
you are the one percent. If you earn at least $28,000 […] you are in the richest five percent of 
the world’s population” . This remarkable ‘fortune’ (of being at the top of the heap) should 56
not be wasted. It is our greatest tool; for because we are so rich, “the amount by which we 
can benefit others is vastly greater than the amount by which we can benefit ourselves” . 57
 
54 Ibid 48 
 
55 ​typically countries mainly composed of people of European descent, who claim a shared intellectual 
and cultural community deriving from ancient Greece and Rome. 
 
56 Doing good better, pg. 18. 
 
57 Ibid 55. 
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Will MacAskill, the movement’s figurehead, cites studies of subjective well being by 
two very respected economists that analyze the relationship between income and well-being. 
The relationship, the economists find, is “roughly log-linear”: subjective well-being increases 
as income increases, and if at all there is a “satiation” point when this is no longer the case, 
most of the world is yet to reach this point. The corollary here is that the subjective benefit 
somebody in the west gets from having their salary doubled is the same that anybody, 
anywhere, gets from having ​their​ own salaries doubled .  58
 
The implications of this are astounding to those who, like myself, had never thought 
of them before. Based on the average (in 2015) American wage of $28,000 p.a and the 
average Indian wage (also in 2015) of $220 , it would take another $28,000 - thus an annual 59
salary of $56,000, for the average American to be twice as happy. It would only take an 
additional $220 - thus an annual income of $440, for the average Indian to be as happy.  
 
From this, comes the Effective Altruist’s “100* Multiplier” : the American is many 
times over more privileged than the Indian, so if one (an American/ Westerner) is an effective 
altruist, then they should expect to do at least 100 times as much to benefit other people as 
they can to benefit themselves. The idea is to maximize this “impact”. Sure, a normal 
effective altruist on a normal American wage, with just a few adjustments in living style, can 
save 100 people ( in a lifetime) - or do 100 times the equivalent of the good he could have 
58 Stevenson, Betsey, & Wolfers, Justin. (2013). “Subjective Well-Being and Income: Is there any 
Evidence of Satiation?”​ American Economic Review. Papers & Proceedings 2013, 103(3): 598–604 
 
59 MacAskill’s statistic is $220 p.a; though there are competing ones - such as a gallup poll that puts it 
at $660. Regardless, this does not affect his argument, for we are interested in the ratio of the two 
incomes rather than the actual minutiae of the figures. So we’ll work with the statistics MacAskill 
provides. 
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done for himself. But most of the people MacAskill is talking to are not “normal Americans” 
with normal American earning potentials; they are brilliant students and professors at 
prestigious educational institutions who have the capacity to earn more than four or five 
terms the wages of the normal American. 
 
This maximization principle goes not just for donations that we ourselves give. It also 
goes for the kinds of careers we choose. Don’t be a philosopher; be a banker. Don’t be a 
political scientist; be a politician. MacAskill entreats us to think “marginally” and 
“counterfactually” about these.  
 
Here’s how to think marginally: Why do New York City transit workers earn more 
($77,991 p.a) than New York City teachers ($68, 151 p.a)? Presumably, teachers’ effect on 
society is more than that of city transit workers - for teachers affect the fundamental rubric of 
our societies, determining what kinds of adult human beings ed up existing and making 
decisions about important stuff. There are also more teachers than there are city transit 
workers, so ideally one would expect that teachers - say if they unionized - would have 
greater bargaining power than city transit workers.  
 
However, the results play out counterintuitively. If city transit workers went on strike 
today, the effects would be much worse than if teachers went on strike. Children missing a 
few days of school is, it seems, a more preferable consequence when compared to a city 
whose garbage has not been collected, whose toilets have not been washed, and whose public 
transport systems have not been functioning, for a few days.  
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The city could thus always use another city transit worker, for the fact that they are so 
few in number makes each of them very important. The city will, however, be fine if ten, or a 
hundred, more teachers are not added to its ranks; partly because public education is just not 
a priority in America right now, and partly because those posts will be easily filled with 
young graduates, eager to work for Teach for America and such other programs. So while the 
total ​value of teachers to society outweighs that of city transit workers, transit workers have a 
much higher ​marginal ​value.  
 
In a similar thought process, (MacAskill’s example), if one wants to be a doctor, then 
one ought be a doctor in a developing country, where one is really needed - and thus has 
much higher marginal value, and where one’s impact would be much larger (one would then 
do 100 times more good) than if one were a doctor in a developed country, where the supply 
for doctor far outstrips the needs of the populace, and the good one would do would be much 
less (measured in QALYs). 
 
And here’s how to think counterfactually: What if, before signing up to do medicine 
in the first place, one evaluated the expected good from the occupation of being a doctor ​vis a 
vis​ other occupations? One QALY represents a year lived in perfect health. As a doctor in a 
developing country, one would save, say, 300 lives (10950 QALYs - assuming an additional 
life span in perfect health of 36.5 years i.e. 36.5 QALYs per life on average) over a career 
spanning 40 years . But if one did not take up the doctor’s job, someone else would step 60
60 Statistic derived from Srinivasa. 
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right in (MacAskill refers to this as replaceability). There is, he thinks, no shortage of 
well-intentioned people -including doctors - seeking to help others in need.  
 
The alternative:  In 2017, the starting salary of a first year lawyer at New York Law 
Firm Cravath, Swaine and Moore was $ 190,000, with bonuses of $5,000. This went up 
yearly, with seventh year associates earning base salaries of $340,000 and bonuses of 
$25,000 . If, over a forty year career, one worked at a law firm such as Cravath, and one 61
donated, say, 50,000 for the first few years, increasing it progressively as one climbed up the 
ranks to when, say, one is a senior partner earning roughly $2,000,000 p.a., and donating say, 
half of this for the last ten years of their career, one would have donated roughly $15,000,000 
by the time they retire. A donation of $3400 to the Against Malaria Foundation, by 
MacAskill’s estimates, would save one life. That means $15,000,000 would save roughly 
4412 lives. At the rate of 36.5 QALYs per life, why, that would be a whooping 161,038 
QALYs! 
 
The task is thus set for the effective altruist: thinking marginally and counterfactually 
tells us that what you should do is put yourself in a position where you can earn as much as 
you can, then give as much as you can - maximize, be efficient. There is intense thought 
applied to the calculations detailed above. Yet one cannot help thinking that there is a certain 
thoughtlessness to them as well, particularly that of the person choosing the career - the one 
being entreated to earn to give. For example, for some years, the 80,000 hours website 
recommended investment banking as a career choice with immense donating potential, 
61 “Cravath has Spoken - and Beats Millbank for Senior Associates”. 
https://abovethelaw.com/2018/06/cravath-hath-spoken-and-beats-milbank-for-senior-associates/ 
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sometimes outright denying that any form of earning to give caused more harm than good  62 63
. However, calculations were later done. It was “shown” that going into investment banking 
actually did cause harm.  
 
Amia Srinivasan notes:  
 
“MacAskill says he no longer recommends that people go into banking, or at least not 
the parts of it that he thinks cause direct harm: creating risks that will be borne by 
unsuspecting taxpayers, or selling products that no properly informed person would buy. 
Instead 80,000 Hours now encourages people to take what it sees as morally neutral or 
positive jobs: quantitative hedge-fund trading, management consulting, technology start-ups. 
(You can take a careers quiz on the 80,000 Hours website; I was told to become a consultant, 
because of its earning-to-give potential and the general business education it provides. When 
I changed my answers to say that I was bad at maths I was told to go into politics.)”  64
 
What follows? Ideally, the many effective altruists who had gone into investment 
banking quit this “morally controversial” career, and pursue those other morally ‘neutral’ or 
‘positive’ careers, for example those listed above - management consulting, technology 
start-ups, etc. But now that McKinsey, perhaps the world’s top consulting company, has been 
62 Todd, Benjamin. (2013). “Show me the Harm: Does Earning to Give Cause more Harm than 
Good?” 80,000 hours blog. ​https://80000hours.org/2013/07/show-me-the-harm/ 
 
63 Redwood, Zander. (2012). “Is Banking Harmful?” 80,000 hours blog. 
https://80000hours.org/2012/01/is-banking-harmful/ 
 
64 Srinivasan, Amia. (2015). “Stop the Robot Apocalypse” London Review of Books. Volume 37. No 
18.24. 
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shown to cooperate with authoritarian leaders who persecute ethnic minorities , and has even 65
been shown to have helped in providing information on critics who criticize these 
governments  - information which then led to the death of said critics; and now that tech 66
companies such as Facebook have been shown, among other things, to have increased levels 
of social anxiety among users, and to have grossly mishandled user-data, both leading to 
pernicious consequences, not least of which was influencing the outcome of an American 
election, and with it the lives of quite literally everyone in the globe, is it perhaps time to 
recalculate? 
 
It is this thoughtlessness of the typical effective altruist, and the consequent amount of 
moral decision-making that then becomes the purview of moral “experts” like MacAskill, 
that worries. (S)he - the effective altruist- is given respite from actual thinking; from 
personally wrestling with difficult decisions of what most of us consider genuine moral 
conundrums, and of the practicable consequences of her decisions - so long as, in general, 
they are seen to generate more QALYs. Instead, these decisions are relegated to the utilitarian 
experts, who then “objectively” assess them in a bid to maximize QALYs, and when their 
measurements are found wanting (as with the investment banking case), then the effective 
altruists simply make adjustments, and move on to whatever new recommendation is to be 
given; whatever maximizes QALYs at this moment. 
 
65 ​https://www.businessinsider.com/mckinsey-china-uighur-corporate-retreat-china2018-12 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/15/world/asia/mckinsey-china-russia.html 
 
66https://www.forbes.com/sites/michaelposner/2018/12/18/how-mckinsey-co-fails-as-a-global-leader/#
5570f523376d 
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 Of course, one could think of this as pragmatically learning from mistakes - they 
thought investment banking was good, they realized it wasn’t, they updated. But this 
learning, from the pragmatic point of view, is in many ways flawed because it holds as its 
teleology what it considers an objective good; it does not so much pay heed to what 
practicable results may be preferable, and for whom. And it does not recognize that what are 
to be considered preferable outcomes are contingent, and differ from group to group. Rather, 
it is simply interested in achieving its priorly stated objective end, in QALYs. It is not a 
learning that recognizes the messiness of the world, and that therefore necessarily includes 
democracy in determining value, but one that seeks to fine-tune a system - in a sense, to 
exchange democracy for objectivity; so that those who participate in it can go about with 
their lives with as little moral thinking as possible.  
 
The insistence on maximization and effectivity, at every turn, recalls Sidgwick’s 
“point of view of the universe”. Good can only be maximized fairly if no one has any direct 
stakes (except in good ​qua​ good). Democracy is thus a second order priority here; one only 
incidentally sought out. Sure, maximization of QALYs  might usually go hand in hand with 
democratic values, but whenever these two don’t go together, the actions of the Effective 
Altruists seem to suggest: Let us serve a higher imperative than democracy - objectivity. 
 
Through all these attempts at Sidgwick-ian objectivity however, we witness that even 
for the utilitarian “moral experts”, the messiness of the world asserts itself. The failures in 
prediction of the calculations of the effective altruists signify the inherent inability of the 
world to be understood and mastered entirely through models or moral theorization. At every 
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turn, we are brought back to understandings of the world which some of us view as common 
sense, due to membership of our respective communities, and which some of us reject, also 
due to being members of particular communities. The resolution to these differences in 
views, if there is one, is necessarily political. Some of us think prisons need to be abolished; 
some think prisons are absolutely necessary for a well-functioning democratic society. Some 
of us think sweatshops are abominable, some (including the effective altruists ) think that 67
there is a moral case to be made for sweatshops.  
 
After all of that has been said, we realize that if there is an argument that will change 
our minds and compel us to adopt a new position over the one we previously did, it will not 
be a calculation showing what generates more QALYs; for not only do we disagree on 
whether some things can be compared or quantified in the first place, but even when we do 
decide to compare some things, we find it impossible to agree on what value to attach to each 
of them. How many people are you willing to see die before you can sacrifice your child? - It 
is a silly question, yet it is questions of this sort that the sort of emphasis on maximization 
that effective altruism - and utilitarianism, broadly construed, - champions, compels us to ask.  
 
And even when we have statistics, what data we view as relevant is, I argue, in the 
first place determined by our points of view (i.e. communities of belonging) that we already 
had before we came into contact with the data. This is the essence of what William James 
called the “Will to Believe”  - that the evidence of whether certain beliefs are to be 68
67 Doing Good Better, pg. 131. “Because sweatshops are good for poor countries. If we boycott them 
we make people in poor countries worse off”. 
 
68 James, William. (1896). “The Will to Believe”. In perhaps his most famous article, James took to 
tackle the relationship between faith, reason, and evidence. James argued that there were two kinds 
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considered true or false hinges, first and foremost, on those beliefs being taken up without 
evidence, in the traditional sense.  
 
What might change our minds, if they will be changed at all, will be to be convinced 
to adopt what Richard Rorty termed the “language”  of our interlocutors - to join their 69
community of intersubjective agreement, through a process he called “humiliation”. It will be 
to be convinced that our interlocutor’s point of view is “right” because we think it presents 
the best practicable outcomes for the broadest range of what is considered “us”.  
 
And even in pursuing this agreed upon “right”, we will have no choice but to 
acknowledge that we might be wrong i.e. that the outcomes of our choices might not yield 
desirable practicable consequences. As Srinivasa notes, “effective altruists … ” despite their 
claims to suppossed objectivity, “like everyone else who wants to make the world better, 
must do what strikes them as best, without any final sense of what that might be, or any 
guarantee that they are getting it right” . 70
 
We are thus here led to see the futility of “moral experts” such as the effective 
altruism leaders - and the undesirable consequences of creating “moral imbeciles”. If there 
were a possibility that they (the moral experts) could be “objectively” right with respect to 
of beliefs - hypothesis venturing, and self-fulfilling, where it was rational to believe without evidence. In 
the first case, think of when a scientist deeply has a hunch about something - without the evidence for 
it, and goes about proving it, until she finds the evidence. And in the second case, think of the famous 
doctrine of double determination in Homeric Epic, whereby the hero, by believing that he was under 
the influence of a God, went on to accomplish much greater feats in battle than he would have had he 
not had this belief. 
 
69 Rorty, Richard. (1989) “The Contingency of Language” in Contingency, Irony and Solidarity. 
70 Ibid 63 
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some objective teleology, if this whole life thing was just a series of calculations, then there 
would be use for them. But as I have been arguing, in the absence of this overriding 
objectivity, what’s left is all of us stumbling around - and the only way to make this 
stumbling more bearable for everyone; the only way to produce the most preferable results 
for the broadest “us”, is to seek the broadest agreement on how to best stumble together.  
 
Democratic experience is thus what is most fundamental here, and this is exactly what 
is lost when moral imbeciles are created, moral imbeciles who, as Jane Addams notes, pursue 
their own ideals, leaving those ideals unconnected with the concerns of their fellow man. By 
positing maximization as the objective standard, the effective altruists promote Nussbaum’s 
“moral heedlessness” by those who are keen to maximize their “impact” yet are unwilling to 
confront the messiness of the world - and all the bad practicable results that this sort of moral 
heedlessness brings about.  
 
 
The Markets. The Markets! ...And Structural Reform 
 
This moral heedlessness, leftist critics of Effective Altruism have argued, shores up 
oppressive superstructures (particularly market capitalism) - superstructures which are 
themselves the causes of the problems that Effective Altruism seeks to fix. By focusing 
entirely on the market as what is capable of solving the pressing problems we face, Effective 
altruist do not question their roles and positions within this market, and what this continued 
participation in the market means for those they are trying to help. 
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 Influential thinkers such as Mike Davis  and the earlier  Amartya Sen  , for 71 72 73 74
example, have written on how markets are complicit in causing human deprivation and 
suffering. For the Effective Altruists however, the insistence on markets arises from the belief 
that, on average, markets do ​more​ good than harm. Effective altruists are not against 
anti-market schools of thought ​per se​, they are pro whatever is efficient and maximizes 
QALYs - it just happens that right now, it is market capitalism that does that. Does the “free” 
market have problems? Sure, they agree. But as long as no feasible alternative is available, 
the effective altruists prefer to work within it, for as of now, it is what produces “the most 
good”. 
 
Critics however point out that Effective Altruism’s strategy - and that of charity in 
general - is one where three relations exist: the donor, the aid agency, and the person to be 
saved. All these relations are mediated by the market, which determines the costs of life 
necessities that the person to be saved requires. This is to say, if the donor does not transfer 
the money to the aid agency, then the person to be saved perishes. This market logic holds for 
more than just donations: Effective altruism also argues for things such as sweatshops using 
it. 
71 Davis, Mike. (2001). Late Victorian Holocausts: El-Nino Famines and the Making of the Third World. 
Verso. 
 
72 Later Sen, (particularly in “Development as Freedom, 1999) after developing the influential 
capabilities approach, looks at markets more favourably for their abilities to contribute to bringing 
freedoms and doing away with what he calls “unfreedoms”. 
 
73 Sen, Amartya Kumar. (1981). Poverty and Famines: An Essay on Entitlement and Deprivation. 
Clarendon Press, Oxford 
 
74 Sen, Amartya Kumar. (1973). On Economic Inequality. Clarendon Press, Oxford. 
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“​Those who protest sweatshops​”, they contend, “​by refusing to buy the goods 
produced in them, are making the mistake of failing to consider what would happen 
otherwise…​(Here’s the counterfactual again)​ In poor countries, sweatshop jobs are the good 
jobs. Because sweatshops are good for poor countries, if we boycott them we make people in 
poor countries worse off​” .  75
 
And when speaking about climate change: while cutting down our consumption of 
meat and dairy products, reducing our travel, and being more mindful of the amounts of 
water, gas and electricity we consume in our homes are all fine and dandy, what the effective 
altruists think really works is called “offsetting”. What this means is that rather than reducing 
one’s own greenhouse emissions, one instead pays “for projects that reduce or avoid 
greenhouse gas emissions elsewhere” . The QALYs show these are the most effective 76
approaches. 
 
This entrenched focus on the market as the harbinger of solutions entirely ignores the 
systems that produces the problems to be fixed in the first place.  If we are to take Sen’s and 
Davis’ criticisms seriously, then we are, it seems, being forced to play the charade of paying 
“the market” what it demands so it can solve the problems it had a large part in creating.  
 
Effective Altruism, in this sense, aside from its promotion of the above mentioned 
heedlessness, does not historicize. There is no thought paid to systems like colonization, 
75 Ibid 67, pg. 130 
76 Ibid 67, pg 137 
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economic exploitation, market-instigated gender discrimination etc. that led to the problems it 
is trying to fix. It does not speak of how people in the west came to be in a position to “save 
the world” in the first place. It is apolitical to the core. Instead, the moral guilt (for the 
suffering of others, as in Unger’s example at the beginning of part 2) is directed at 
individuals, and in the same way, the responsibility for fixing these problems is also so 
piecemeal-ly affixed. 
 
 Michael Snow notes: 
 
“​If we look at the institutions that make and allocate the resources others so 
desperately need, we must ask whether it is wrong to withhold these resources from others for 
the sake of payment and profit. Doing so not only seems morally reprehensible, it is morally 
reprehensible for precisely the same reasons effective altruists argue it is wrong not to 
donate money to charities: it is wrong to value some small sum of money (or what it might 
buy) over a human life or a minimum standard of living​”  77
 
It is therefore not shocking that the world’s capitalist elite prefers the kind of 
philanthropy advocated by effective altruism, and other kinds of atomized, non-political ways 
of dealing with the structural issues effective altruism aims to tackle, as opposed to methods 
that are political and systematic. As Anand Giridharadas notes, this is the typical case where 
the people who will most lose if actual social change occurs place themselves at the forefront 
77 Snow, Michael. (2016). Against Charity. Jacobin Magazine. 
https://www.jacobinmag.com/2015/08/peter-singer-charity-effective-altruism 
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of leading said social change  - i.e. by making sure it does not happen in the first place, or, at 78
the very least, not in ways that threaten them. For example, the Bill and Melinda Gates 
Foundation, a foundation run by the second richest person in the world, has expressed strong 
approval for MacAskill’s work on Effective Altruism  and its ​modus operandi​; Michael Dell, 79
the billionaire founder of the eponymous Dell Computers, argued against a tax hike for those 
earning above $10,000,000 so as to address pertinent structural issues, saying that private 
foundations were much better suited at allocating funds and dealing with societal problems 
than were governments . 80
 
But even more, Effective altruism’s strange relation to the market is also, for the 
morally heedless person, touted as a way to achieve self worth and a stable sense of self in a 
consumerist world in shambles.  
 
Peter Singer says:  
 
“The hedonic hamster wheel of a consumer lifestyle: You work hard to get money. 
You spend that money on consumer goods which you hope you will enjoy using. Then the 
money is gone. You have to work hard to get more and spend more to maintain the same level 
78 Giridharadas, Anand. (2018). Winner Takes All: The Elite Charade of Changing the World. ​Alfred A. 
Knopf Books​. 
 
79 Desmond-Hellmann, Sue. (2015). The Case for Putting your Head where your Heart is. Medium. 
https://medium.com/bill-melinda-gates-foundation/the-case-for-putting-your-head-where-your-heart-is-
e5523da22f50 
 
80 “Dell CEO joins Davos Debate on 70% tax rate: ‘Not Supportive’ “. 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-01-23/dell-ceo-joins-davos-debate-on-70-tax-rate-not-
supportive 
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of happiness. You never get off the hamster wheel, and you never really feel satisfied. You 
become spiritually exhausted and wonder if your life is worth living. Becoming an effective 
altruist gives you that meaning and fulfillment. It enables you to have a solid basis for 
self-esteem on which you can feel your life is really worth living.”  81
 
This feel-good guide, which recommends individual donating action as what brings 
about meaning and fulfillment in life, depicts a lack of what C. Wright Mills called a 
“Sociological Imagination”  - that personal experiences are inextricably interconnected with 82
public issues. Just like the issues that the effective altruists are trying to chip away at - 
poverty, racial and gender discrimination, etc. are structural, so too the source of this lack of 
personal fulfillment, one with Mills’ sociological imagination would argue, are structural.  
What is needed, for both the ills that effective altruism tries to work on, and for a 
“solid basis for self esteem”, as they call it, i.e. for a turn from moral heedlessness, is 
structural reform and deeper community engagement. To remove oneself from a 
“consumerist” lifestyle while continuing to contribute to the structures that make it possible 
in the first place is farcical. 
 
But the Effective Altruists have answers to these charges that they neglect systemic 
political change in exchange for atomized market action. First, they argue that “Effective 
Altruists​ love​ systemic change” . They provide a list of initiatives to show this. This list 83
81 Singer, Peter. Instagram post. ​https://www.instagram.com/p/BsrFBgiAMdI/ 
 
82 Mills, C. Wright. (1959). “The Sociological Imagination”. Clarendon Press: Oxford University 
 
83 Wilbin, Robert. (2015). “Effective Altruists Love Systemic Change”.. 80,000 hours Blogpost. 
https://80000hours.org/2015/07/effective-altruists-love-systemic-change/ 
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includes their open philanthropy project - whose mission it is “to give as effectively as we 84
can and share our findings openly so that anyone can build on our work”, the Open Borders 
project  - which seeks to address issues of immigration, especially as pertaining to the United 85
States but also related to the broader refugee crisis, and finally, GiveWell  - which seeks to 86
transform attitudes towards giving.  
 
Secondly, the effective altruists give the argument provided in reply to Nussbaum’s 
contention (at the beginning of this second part of the essay- and also alluded to at the 
beginning of this section on markets). They argue that of course, systems are important, but 
that while the systems do not yet exist, they are much more concerned with what individual 
actors can do to address contingent problems in the meantime. In fact, they argue that 
sometimes these individual actions chip away at systems and lead - eventually - to the 
bettering of these systems, such that they are no longer seen as morally nefarious. Supporting 
sweatshops, for example, provides the best available option for workers in poor countries. 
Effective Altruists tacitly invoke modernization theory, typically used in international 
relations theory here: sweatshops are an inherent part of development, and as more 
sweatshops arise, more alternatives are available to workers. This increases their (workers’) 
bargaining power to such an extent that the resulting working conditions and wages are not 
exploitative anymore . The market eventually stabilizes itself- just look at China! 87
84 ​https://www.openphilanthropy.org/ 
 
85 ​https://openborders.info/ 
 
86 ​https://www.givewell.org/ 
 
87 Powell, Benjamin. (2008). “In Defense of ‘Sweatshops’”. The Library of Economics and Liberty. 
https://www.econlib.org/library/Columns/y2008/Powellsweatshops.html 
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 On the first of their replies: perhaps we disagree on what “systemic change” means. 
For most people, organizations - the kinds that the effective altruists mention, are a necessary 
precondition to systemic change. But they are not sufficient. What matters more than just the 
existence of organizations doing ​something​, is the issues that those organizations concern 
themselves with - and typically, these are issues structural social, political and economic, 
usually created and maintained by markets and political structures.  
 
Even more importantly, what matters is the potential political efficacy of those 
organizations - and this efficacy requires democracy and political solidarity for it to be 
attained. Addressing these requires political organizing and lobbying, mass action, and the 
democratic inclusion of the broadest swathes of people potentially affected, and those 
together in solidarity, in discussing, planning, and carrying out whatever actions are agreed 
upon democratically. For most of us, systemic change does not consist in telling rich and 
middle class western people where to best donate, as GiveWell, one of their examples of 
“systemic change” - does. So if the initiatives outlined above are their example of systemic 
change, I simply deny the charge that effective altruists ​love ​systemic change. 
 
One the second answer: while the contention provided here - that of addressing 
contingent problems while the systems are still absent- works well against Nussbaum’s 
dystopian visions, it does not do so well against the challenge of the leftists. The leftists 
contend that it is a zero-sum affair: the atomization that effective altruism, by concentrating 
on individuals, promotes, is actually detrimental to structural organizing. Paul Bamberg 
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argues that the kind of activity the effective altruists are engaged in promotes “political 
quietism” - which is a similar charge to Nussbaum’s heedlessness.  88
 
In effect, some leftists, in a bid to show that this argument from contingency does not 
hold here, call into question  Singer’s analogy of the child drowning in the pond that Unger - 89
and the effective altruists- make use of. In Singer’s case of the drowning child, the beauty of 
the thought experiment is its simplicity. It does not matter that there are other children 
drowning elsewhere, or that the city council should have built fences to ensure that children 
do no fall into muddy ponds and drown. The fact of the matter is that I am here, and I can 
save ​this ​drowning child. Should I refuse to do so because I would rather be pursuing 
systematic change? No. In the same way, there are people dying right now - and these deaths 
are preventable. The Effective Altruists ask: are we going to let them die simply because we 
are intent on pursuing systematic change? 
 
But this - the shift from the case of the child, to that of market-caused problems, is a 
disanalogy. It is not that the child has fallen into the pond and we must save him; it is, as 
Snow notes, that capital has pushed the child into the pond (in this case, by causing famines, 
for example, or by continued global trade and finance policies that continue to disenfranchise 
“third world” countries), and it then requires that we pay it what it demands so it can save the 
child. The needs of the people effective altruism concerns itself with are life-sustaining: food, 
88 Bamberg, Paul. (2002). “The Fallacy of Philanthropy”. Canadian Journal of Philosophy. Volume 32, 
No. 1, March 2002, pp. 29-66. 
 
89 Ibid 77 
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medical attention, better working conditions; and the resources to address these needs do 
indeed exist - as shown by the mere fact that they can be bought in the “free” market.  
 
These needs can be structurally provided for through people-centered government 
services, redress of historical wrongs, and projects like universal basic income (UBI), 
progressive taxation, fairer trade policies, cracking down on corruption - particularly that 
between western multinationals and “third world” governments, etc. These are fights that 
require critical mass and political organization; that demand political will instead of 
piecemeal donation, and fulfilling our moral quotas by donating, as effective altruism 
recommends, much as this makes us feel good about ourselves and supposedly “gives us a 
sense in purpose” as Singer argues, just will not do.  
 
But even setting these objections aside, suppose that we provisionally decide to buy 
into Effective Altruism’s argument of maximization and efficiency, the question then 
becomes, is the “free” market really what is efficient and maximizing? Some people would 
want to express uncertainty, and argue that we really cannot tell i.e. that we do not - cannot - 
have sufficient data, that there are too many variables involved for us to be able to tell 
conclusively on a global scale. Making such a claim, they think, would be to sacrifice nuance 
at the feet of a principle of parsimony- and the problem with this, they think, is that the world 
is simply not simple: sacrificing nuance renders the entire project useless. The unstated 
premise here, of course, is that in the hypothetical that we could gather sufficient data, we 
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could be able to conclusively tell whether the world had become ​better​ or ​worse​ as a 
consequence of market capitalism .  90
 
Others would like to think that the “facts” just don’t lie. They would point out how 
many people have been “lifted out of poverty” since China opened itself to the “free market”, 
and since the collapse of the Soviet Union made American-led liberal capitalism the 
dominant political-economic superstructure , . Others, of whom I am one, would point to a 91 92
different set of “facts”, to the damages instigated by markets: famines, economic exploitation 
of some countries by others, climate change. In fact, they would argue that all the problems 
that effective altruism is trying to address - including technological singularity - were directly 
caused by the markets - which the effective altruists are now relying on to address these 
issues. 
 
 There is no way to put a number to any of these views that will satisfy everyone 
involved. It comes down to, as we pragmatists argue, expressions of community belonging. 
The point here is that even when we accept (and remember, this is hypothetical acceptance) 
the principal of maximization as a desired consequence, there are still no “objective” ways of 
dealing with the problems we identify - of knowing what exactly maximizes - of agreeing on 
what is to be maximized. Of course all these parties would want to say that their view coheres 
90 Rothman, Joshua. (2018). “Are Things Getting Better or Worse? : Why Assessing the State of the 
World is Harder than it Sounds”. The New Yorker. 
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/07/23/are-things-getting-better-or-worse 
 
91 Pinker, Steven. (2011). “Better Angels of our Nature”. Viking Books 
 
92 Rosling, Hans, Ronnlund, Anna Rosling, Rosling, Ola (2018). “Factfullness: Ten Reasons we are 
wrong about the world - and why things are better than you think”. Flatiron Books;New York. 
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best with reality - but that just confirms the argument I am making here. We are, it seems, 
still left at the feet of multiple versions of “common sense”; at the feet of contingency- what 
sounds good to​ our ​community based on the values​ we​ think ​we​ have, on our shared 
historical understanding, and ​our​ agreed upon ways of viewing the world.  
 
Even here then, the best  course of action is political and democratic - we are brought 93
back to stuttering convictions, and our best recourse is solidarity in attempting to combat the 
challenges we face. A defense of the markets (based on its inherent preferability due to some 
perceived objective correspondence with reality, when this preferability cannot be measured 
or stated conclusively in the first place) renders effective altruists intellectually dishonest. 
There is therefore a need by effective altruists to take these leftist critiques of the market 
system seriously, and, as I have been arguing all along, to replace their ideas of objective 
truths, one being the supposed efficacy of the market right now, with democratically agreed 
upon preferable consequences. 
 
 
 
` The Best Causes // I am Me 
 
93 My usage of the term “best” here is just another exemplum of how trapped within our language we 
are. By “best”, I intend the term as a general flexible commendation for my own point of view - to 
signify my (and my community’s) preference of it over other points of view. As Rorty argues, the terms 
“true” (and “best”) mean the same in all cultures, just like the equally flexible terms “here”, “there”, 
“good” and “bad”. But the identity of meaning is of course compatible with the diversity of difference, 
and the diversity of procedures for assigning the terms”. So the pragmatist deems herself free to use 
the terms as general forms of commendation - as everyone else does - and in particular to commend 
her own views. 
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You are taking a walk when you see a house on fire, and several people 
outside it. You go to see what’s happening, as undoubtedly most people there have. When 
you get there, you are told that there’s a child trapped inside the burning house. No one is 
willing to go inside to save the child, much as they feel for him. It’s just too risky for their 
own lives; the fire’s too strong.  
 
You are of the same opinion, even though you are deeply saddened about the child 
dying. But then you look up at the house, and on a window ledge in the second floor, you see 
a beautiful Siamese cat trapped inside. Now, for whatever reason, you care very very deeply 
about cats, and Siamese cats are just your favorite. There’s no way you’re letting this cat die. 
You dash into the house, run past the child trapped on the first floor, straight to the second 
floor where the cat is. You grab the beautiful creature, cradle it, and run back outside. 
Luckily, neither of you is hurt. You are glad you have done something good, the beautiful cat 
is safe. Pity about that boy though. The other people outside look at you. They are angry. 
How dare you save the cat instead of the boy? “But at least I did ​something​!” You shout. 
“What did the rest of you do?” ,  94 95
 
The intuition this little story is trying to get at is contained in the following question: 
Even though you did more than the other observers at the fire, is there reason to think that 
94 Thought experiment paraphrased- and slightly altered (examples), from Theron Pummer’s account. 
In Pummer, Theron. (2016). “Whether and Where to Give”. ​Philosophy and Public Affairs​. Volume 44, 
Issue 1. Winter 2016. Pp. 75 - 95.  
 
95 In Pummer’s example, the animal is a bird, but I personally like cats better. One should feel free to 
put in whatever placeholder animal they deem necessary here; the intuition being targeted is the 
same. 
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you have done something morally wrong, that perhaps you are even more morally 
reprehensible than they are, by saving the cat and not the boy?  
 
Theron Pummer answers, “Yes”.  
 
Here’s another one: It costs $42,000 to train a guide dog, thus, by proxy, $4200 per 
year to provide “eyesight” for one blind person for ten years (assuming the average lifespan 
of a guide dog to be ten years). The charity you donate to does not have overhead costs - or 
these costs are taken care of by other donors, and you are assured that every cent of your 
money will be used to train the dog. On the other hand, another charity, though using only 
seventy percent of its donations (the rest of the funds being used for administrative purposes) 
says it costs $35 to provide cataract surgeries for people in third world countries - in which 
case a donation of $42,000 would mean you would provide eyesight for 840 people . If you 96
choose to donate to the charity training dogs instead of the one providing cataract surgery, 
have you done something morally wrong?  
 
The Effective Altruists think so. 
 
The principle the effective altruists are trying to establish here is that sometimes, we 
can be fine with people not donating or not doing good, but that once one has decided to do 
good, if they do not do the ​most good​ they could have done, then they have done something 
morally wrong.  
96 Yakubchik, Boris. (2011). “It is Effectiveness, not overhead, that Matters”. 80,000 hours blog. 
https://80000hours.org/2011/11/it-is-effectiveness-not-overhead-that-matters/ 
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Now here’s another one. Nick Bostrom works at the University of Oxford and directs 
the Future of Humanity Institute (FHI) . Bostrom’s work concerns the possibility of human 97
extinction, primarily extinction that comes about as a result of artificial intelligence (AI). The 
probability of AI induced extinction is not high - it is quite low in fact. But were it to happen 
(and this is ​probable​, even if ​not likely​, don’t forget), its consequences would be “near 
infinitely bad”. Thus even the tiniest step to reduce this probability is “near infinitely 
valuable”.  
 
Bostrom says; 
 
“If there is a one percent chance of this (extinction) happening, the expected value of 
reducing an existential threat by a billionth of a billionth of one percent would be worth a 
hundred billion times the value of a billion present day lives​”  98
 
Based on the principle outlined above - that if one has the opportunity to do good, and 
one does not do the most good they can, then one has done something morally wrong - it thus 
serves, for the effective altruists, that, in QALY terms - if we are to take Bostrom’s 
calculation seriously, donating to artificial intelligence research trumps anything else. Despite 
97 ​https://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/ 
 
98 Khatchadourian, Rafi. (2015). “The Doomsday Invention: Will Artificial Intelligence Bring us Utopia 
or Destruction?” . The New Yorker.  
 
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/11/23/doomsday-invention-artificial-intelligence-nick-bostr
om  
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the lower likelihood of an intelligence explosion, what we ​really ​should be directing most of 
our energies towards is not global poverty and exploitation; not eradicating disease; not 
discrimination based on race and/or gender or sexual orientation (even though, of course, we 
should allocate whatever​ spare ​time and energy we have towards these).  
 
No, it is artificial intelligence research. And since one accepted the maximization 
argument in the first two cases (boy vs. cat in the burning house case, and the guard dog vs. 
cataract surgery case), one ​must,​ logically, accept this one too! It is no wonder that, once 
again, the world’s capitalist elite has jumped on this bandwagon. Elon Musk, Jeff Bezos, 
Richard Branson et al. For all these rich men, the colonization of outer space to ‘save 
humanity’ from possible extinction has become an agendum of the highest priority, and 
Bostrom’s book, ​Superintelligence , has been a lighthouse for them. 99
 
It is these strange analogical leaps that are troubling. Demandingness  is often posed 100
as an objection -or support, depending on your school of thought- to utilitarianism. But the 
demandingness objection rests on intuitions regarding actions that one deems supererogatory 
- praiseworthy but not obligatory. As Pummer points out, both of the options are at first 
seemingly supererogatory. No one compels, and not many people think it morally required, 
for one to jump into the burning house to save the boy at risk of their own life in the first 
case. And in the second case, donating itself is deemed supererogatory for most people 
99 Bostrom, Nick. (2014). “Superintelligence: Paths, Dangers, Strategies”. Clarendon Press: Oxford 
University. 
 
100 Explained in Footnote 19. 
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(although of course some  utilitarians argue that it is not), before one even decides whether to 
donate to training the guard dog or to providing cataract surgery.  
 
The catch comes once one recognizes another layer of demandingness. The Effective 
Altruists contend that once one decides to perform an action, one is then ​morally required​ to 
perform the best action of that kind. To not do “the most/best good”  one can do then 101
becomes an avoidance of moral obligation, a moral transgression. 
 
Many non-utilitarians reject this argument. As I have been arguing all through this 
section, we do not want to be told what to care about just because it is what’s maximizing - 
even though sometimes maximization may be a factor. And even though some maximizing 
cases might augur with some of our intuitions - like the case with the boy vs. the cat and the 
case with the cataracts vs. the guide dog - not all such cases strike our intuitions the same 
way, especially not when they relate to ​us​ having to make a choice between something ​we 
care about, and some other thing that is supposedly more important, but not as relevant to ​us​, 
or not of direct impact to ​our​ lives. 
 
It is therefore not of much practical value to posit a principle that seemingly underlies 
these cases as a logical imperative. We want to support cancer research because of contingent 
reasons; because ​our​ grandparents died of cancer; even though we realize that Malaria is a 
bigger killer disease. We fund cerebral palsy research centers because ​our​ kid suffers from 
cerebral palsy, even while acknowledging that for humanity - considered abstractly, artificial 
101 Singer, Peter. (2015). “The Most Good you can do: How Effective Altruism is Changing Ideas about 
Living Ethically. Yale University Press. 
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intelligence research is perhaps more significant. At every turn, we are reminded of our 
contingency: that most of the time, we care about things as they happen to ​us​, we view 
everything through ​our​ eyes and through the lenses of ​our ​experiences - experiences shaped 
by communities of belonging, and personal and historical contingencies.  
 
The idea I am reiterating here then is that while maximization can indeed be 
something important, it is not the thing that overrides everything else in importance. It has to 
compete with other facets of our lives as we experience and attach value to them. If, 
therefore, philosophy is to succeed as an agent of social change, it must speak to our lives and 
our experiences, to the ethical conflict that goes on in them; it cannot abstract from them by 
presenting supposed objective logical principles that constitute moral imperatives. 
 
Here, Bernard Williams , that most sustained critic of utilitarianism, provides much 102
insight. Williams was primarily interested in the perspectives that actual human beings, living 
through moral conundrums, had. His rejection of rule-based (primarily deontology) and 
102 It is of utmost necessity that I be careful to elucidate my usage of Williams here. Williams famously 
argued (in ​Truth and Truthfulness​, 2002) against some versions -the Rorty-ian kind - of the 
conceptions of truth that I present here. He contended that human societies needed to think of both 
truth and truthfulness as values, and, correspondingly, sincerity and accuracy as virtues that went 
along with these values.  
It seems to me that what Williams is doing, by positing Robert Nozick’s “potential explanations” of how 
things/notions could have arisen, is simply seeking what Rorty terms a larger community of 
agreement for what is practicable. I have no doubt that most who believe as Williams did will disagree 
with me, but that’s another argument. Nevertheless, Williams deep recognition of the messiness of life 
and his rejection of codified ethics; his belief that philosophy was something that accompanied life 
itself, not replaced it or directed it abstractly, is something he shares with the pragmatists and differs 
with the utilitarians on. I thus believe that a discussion of Williams’ ethics can be presented in support 
of a largely pragmatist argument - even while recognizing the disagreements Williams had with the 
pragmatists - without doing damage to Williams. 
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end-based (primarily utilitarianism) philosophy was based on an interest in “life itself”. Life, 
he thought, was not nearly as neat - or as boring - as moral philosophy made it out to be.  
 
To attempt to understand Williams’ thought, it is necessary to historicize him - though 
I of course risk barbarizing his thought in the process. But I will try my best. 
 
Williams came of age as a philosopher at a time when Universal prescriptivism , first 
introduced by R.M. Hare in his 1952 book - ​The Language of Morals , (itself reeling under 103
the influence of the logical positivists) was hugely popular in moral thought in England. The 
logical positivists, inspired by the earlier Wittgenstein in the ​Tractatus , attempted to 104
scientize all activity that they thought was philosophical by maintaining that the only 
meaningful statements were those which were verifiable - those that satisfied an empirical 
criterion of meaningfulness. Einstein’s proposition about mass-energy equivalence was 
meaningful because it could be verified: E =mc² held true empirically for every instance. The 
same could not be said for “Thou shalt not commit adultery” or “Maximize utility”.  
 
To express moral beliefs then, because they (moral beliefs) could not be empirically 
verified, was merely to express certain attitudes - and therefore not at all a philosophical 
activity. For example, for A.J. Ayer, one of the most prominent logical positivists, for me to 
say “You were wrong in stealing that money” was nothing more than to express the 
103 Hare, Richard. Mervyn. (1952). ​The Language of Morals​. Clarendon Press, Oxford University. 
 
104 Wittgenstein, Ludwig. (1922).​ Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus​. Harcourt, Brace and Company. New 
York. 
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proposition “You stole that money”  - the “were wrong” expressing merely my attitude, and 105
providing no useful propositional content. From this, Hare’s universal prescriptivism came 
up, as a grounding for a notion of morality that did not rely on verificationism. 
 
Hare argued that moral utterances did not try to describe the world so much as they 
tried to provide prescriptions - how it ​ought​ to be, and how one​ ought ​to act in it. In the spirit 
of Kant’s categorical imperative, Hare argued that the sort of prescriptions contained in moral 
utterances were therefore universalizable. If I said one ​ought​ not steal, I meant that​ relevant 
factors​ remaining the same, this imperative held for everyone. It is wrong for ​anyone​ to steal.  
 
From this, the prescriptivists came up with a moral system, whose most important (at 
least to me) facets that I hope to briefly discuss here were 1.) the impossibility of moral 
conflict, and 2.) the idea that every obligation was but an instance of a more general 
obligation, acceptance of the former naturally signifying an acceptance of the latter, and the 
latter subsuming the former. 
 
The first facet of the moral system that I point out posited that whenever two ​oughts 
seemed​ to be in conflict, one of them was eliminable. This was because morality, for the 
prescriptivists, was practical in a way that allowed only one course of action. If, for some 
reason, two of my moral commitments were in conflict, I needed to simply deliberate again, 
and upon doing so, would realize that one of them either was not​ truly​ a moral commitment, 
or that it crumbled under the other.  
105 Ayer, Alfred Jules. (1936). Language, Truth and Logic. Penguin. Pg. 106 
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And here entered Williams. 
 
Williams, in two articles  written in the mid 1960s, took this prescriptivist system 106 107
to task. In these articles, he argued not just for fragility - that luck and chance had some space 
in our moral lives, but he also declared absurd the idea that moral commitments were 
eliminable under one another. In a hearkening to Aristotle’s discussion of ​Akrasia , 108
Williams points to the obvious existence of moral regret as evidence that moral claims did 
not fold under one another. An example of this, provided by Martha Nussbaum in her first 
book , illustrates Williams’ point perfectly. 109
 
 In the Iliad, Agamemnon, the leader of the Greeks, needs to go to war against the 
Trojans. The Trojan Prince, Paris, has stolen Agamemnon’s brother’s (Menelaus) wife 
(Helen), and Agamemnon, as the head of the family, needs to lead the war to save the 
family’s ​kleos​ - honor. However, upon consulting the oracle at Delphi, Agamemnon is told 
that the Greek ships will not sail unless he sacrifices his daughter, Iphigenia, to the Gods.  
 
Agamemnon could certainly have gone the utilitarian way of calculating what 
maximizes (and perhaps he did, for he killed his daughter and went to war). But in my view, 
106 Williams, Bernard. (1966).  Consistency and Realism. The Inaugural Address - Proceedings of the 
Aristotelian Society. ​Supplementary Volumes Vol. 40 (1966), pp. 1-22 (22 pages​) 
 
107 Williams, Bernard. (1965). Ethical Consistency. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. reprinted in 
Bernard Williams, Problems of the Self (Cambridge: University Press, 1973) 
 
108 Aristotle. Nicomachean Ethics. Book 7, Chapter 2. 
 
109 Nussbaum, Martha. (1986). The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and 
Philosophy. Cambridge University Press. 
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and that of Williams and Nussbaum, Agamemnon was placed under a true moral conundrum. 
This was a tragedy, and neither of the options could fold under the other; regret necessarily 
followed whatever option he chose.  
 
Either Agamemnon sacrificed his daughter - someone he loved and cared deeply for - 
and an act that had grave consequences in itself; or he could not go to war, losing his family’s 
kleos​ - the most important thing to a Greek, forever. It was cases like this that Williams used 
to demonstrate the faults in the arguments of the prescriptivists. These cases showed, leaving 
very little doubt, that the moral system the prescriptivists had come up with failed to 
recognize this valid competition of demands, this fragility and presence of moral luck, within 
people’s moral lives. 
 
On the second mentioned facet of the prescriptivist moral system, Williams’ argument 
brings us to perhaps the first sustained argument against demandingness. Williams thought 
that this sleight of hand - of absorbing obligations under one another - would lead to a 
situation where we were supposedly ​rationally​ compelled to hold views that we did not ​truly 
hold. Within a systemic framework, a general obligation is of course derivable, as shown at 
the beginning of this section with the discussion of maximization (boy vs cat, guide dog vs. 
cataracts etc). You believe maximization should occur in this particular case, and in this one, 
and in this one; therefore you hold maximization to be a general principle, of which the 
particulars are instantiations.  
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However for Williams, as for the pragmatists, who both rejected this idea of a 
systemic morality, the idea that a general duty could derive from a particular one did not hold 
- except perhaps trivially. Deriving such a general duty, for Williams, was an implausibly 
demanding view of morality - and whereas the utilitarians thought (and think) that this view 
outlined the extent of our moral commitments to us, bringing forth more stringent 
imperatives, Williams simply thought we should do away with it. It was unrealistic. 
 
Furthermore, the prescriptivists - as with the utilitarians - held fast to an impartial 
account of morality, and this again, Williams thought, went against how life just was. 
Working under their system, one had no special obligations to those closer to them - one’s 
particular obligations were subsumed under the general one. I had no special particular 
obligation that said, say, “save your sick child” that was not subsumed under the general 
obligation “save sick children”. 
 
 In this schema, ​my​ child was just ​a​ child. Williams thought that this missed the point 
completely. I wasn’t saving ​this​ child because it was my general obligation to save children. I 
was saving this child because of the particular place she occupied in ​my​ life, as ​my​ child. 
Moral obligations, Williams thought, could not exist over and above life itself, directing and 
dictating what ought to happen. 
 
This brief discussion of Williams’ ethical thought helps us put into perspective the 
discussion on maximization that have dominated this section. Maximization implies 
eliminibility. To have a moral imperative to do the “most good” implies that our other moral 
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commitments fold under this maximizing principle - and it necessarily implies that we have 
to be impartial. It is to further buy into the idea of particular obligations subsumed under 
general ones; to say that we should donate to artificial intelligence research instead of cancer 
research- despite the fact that our kid died from cancer - because that is what we ​ought​ to do, 
what we are ​rationally compelled​, by the principles we hold, to do. And the reason why this 
is so is because having accepted the maximization rule with regards to the particular, we are 
rationally compelled to accept it in the general as well, and to live correctly with regards to it.  
 
But as Williams very persuasively argued, this just will not do. The idea of a moral 
system, of rules and obligations that derive from it and contain imperatives, “deny - or at the 
very least declare irrelevant, from the outset”, as Nakul Krishna puts it, “the fact that I am 
me” . Williams held that while, indeed, ethical life was important, it was not the sole 110
component to life, and certainly not the only one that had importance. Ethical considerations 
had to accompany life, had to be ​a facet​ of it. ​Oughts​ could not be the lords that reigned 
tyrannically over life - telling us what we, at pain of being illogical or ‘immoral’, were 
rationally compelled to do. Maximization, the Effective Altruist instantiation of this - with its 
dictates of what was ​objectively right​, what we ​ought​ to do, despite our other commitments to 
life, to family, to our own contingencies, should be rejected on the same grounds that 
Williams rejected the prescriptivist moral systems, grounds that I have carefully outlined 
above. 
 
 
110 Krishna, Nakul. (201). Add Your Own Egg. The Point Magazine. 
https://thepointmag.com/2016/examined-life/add-your-own-egg 
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(​The third and final part of this essay will present a pragmatist reading of 
beneficence. It will aim to detail how, in very hazy detail, our ethical lives may look like once 
we accept the pragmatic view of epistemology (as against the utilitarian one) outlined in the 
first part of the essay​.) 
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PART THREE: 
DEMOCRATIC VISTAS   
 
Democracy, and the one true good, are synonymous to me. 
John Dewey 
 
The pragmatist is one who turns away from abstraction and insufficiency, from verbal 
solutions, from bad a priori reasons, from fixed principles, closed systems, and pretended 
absolutes and origins. He turns towards concreteness and adequacy, towards fats, towards 
actions, and towards power. It means the open air and possibilities of nature as against 
dogma, artificiality, and the pretence of finality.  
William James 
 
 ​To attempt to attain a social morality without a basis of democratic experience 
results in the loss of the only possible corrective and guide, and ends in an exaggerated 
individual morality but not in social morality at all.  
Jane Addams  
 
 
“We have met the obligations of our family life, not because we had made resolutions 
to that end, but spontaneously, because of a common fund of memories and affections, from 
which the obligation naturally develops, and we see no other way in which to prepare 
ourselves for the larger social duties." Such a demand is reasonable, for by our daily 
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experience we have discovered that we cannot mechanically hold up a moral standard, then 
jump at it in rare moments of exhilaration when we have the strength for it, but that even as 
the ideal itself must be a rational development of life, so the strength to attain it must be 
secured from interest in life itself”. 
Jane Addams 
 
 
 ​It is possible to cultivate the impulses of the benefactor until the power of attaining a simple 
human relationship with the beneficiaries, that of frank equality with them, is gone, and there 
is left no mutual interest in a common cause. To perform too many good deeds may be to lose 
the power of recognizing good in others; to be too absorbed in carrying out a personal plan 
of improvement may be to fail to catch the great moral lesson which our times offer​. 
Jane Addams 
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Jane Addams’ Hull House in Chicago was an archetype of pragmatist social reform. 
Addams practice was founded on what she called the “three R’s” : 1.) Residence - that Hull 111
house was to work in concert with the local community whose problems it sought to address, 
2.) Research - That there was to be in depth scientific study of the causes of poverty  (in 112
West Chicago); on what the factors that engendered dependence and deprivation were, and 
3.) Reform - That the results of these scientific studies were to be openly communicated to 
the public, that public engagement and agreement had to be sought in figuring out the way 
forward, and that active and persistent campaigns for legislative and social reform had to then 
take place.  
 
Addams, like Dewey, was a heavy believer in participatory democracy. Just like for 
Dewey the town hall was the highlight of democratic life and the basis for social 
reconstruction, so too, for Addams, a deep and enduring engagement with the community, a 
firm belief that the community members had the biggest say in tackling what impacted them, 
was the essence for social action. 
 
Addams project was highly laudable (among many other achievements, with Dewey, 
she helped found the American Civil Liberties Union, and she became the first American 
woman to win the Nobel Prize, for, among other things, founding the field of Social Work as 
we know it today). Yet to propose Addams’ kind of social reform, as I aim to do here, as a 
111 Wade, Louise. (1967). “The Heritage from Chicago’s Early Settlement Houses”. Journal of the 
Illinois State Historical Society”. 60 (4). Pg. 411-441 - pg. 414. 
 
112 Proxy for whatever social problem was being investigated 
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guideline for the sort of social reform and moral progress the Effective Altruists are engaged 
in, seems laughable.  
 
For one, the pragmatist conception of shared experience as the basis for intelligent 
social deliberation and action (as demonstrated by the first R, residence) seems, ​prima facie​, 
incredibly parochial in geography, if not insular in the scope of the issues it concerns itself 
with. Addams’ practice was focused entirely on the challenges facing particular immigrant 
communities in the West Side of Chicago, whereas the concerns of Effective Altruism 
transcend not just geography, but also species membership.  
 
But I think this contention of parochialism is a misplaced worry. In response to it, I 
argue here that “Residence”, for Addams, was a proxy for “community” - a term denoting the 
scope of people, and the bases under which these people were afflicted by certain social 
problems, and could therefore come together to create practicable solutions to these 
problems. At the time Addams was doing her work, that community, for her, happened to be 
European immigrants in the west side of Chicago, and the problems she was addressing were, 
whilst indicative of larger social concerns , particular to certain immigrant communities in 113
the West side.  
 
Yet the idea of what is considered community does not need inherently to be confined 
to physical residency within bounded atomized geographic areas for meaningful practicable 
action to occur. Communities of belonging that people identify with, that attempt to define an 
113 Which Addams did, in fact, address. See, for example, ​Democracy and Social Ethics​ (1927) , ​On 
Education​ (2017), and her famous essay, “​Utilization of Women in City Government​”(1907). 
 
May 2018, Wolf Humanities Center Undergraduate Research Fellowship 
John Aggrey Odera, College of Arts & Sciences, 2019, University of Pennsylvania 
72 
 
“us”, exist within and outside geographical boundaries - think the daughters of the American 
revolution, people of African descent, the feminist movement, Black Lives Matter, the Ku 
Klux Klan, etc. The challenge is simply to make them broader, and to provide bases for doing 
so. 
 
Perhaps then, before moving on, it would be useful to address exactly what kinds of 
community, the bases, Addams thought these ideas referred to.  
 
In just their bare stating, the three R’s seem to be value neutral: white nationalists, for 
example, could come together to jointly address problems affecting them (residence); they 
could conduct in-depth studies on how to tackle said problems - say, in-depth studies in 
eugenics (research); and they could then put these ideas into practice to address whatever it is 
they think is the problem- say, the extermination of non-white people among them (reform). 
These three R’s must therefore, if we are to properly understand Addams’ thought, be 
understood in conjunction with her ideas concerning social meliorism.  
 
One of the advantages of living in defined societies of some sort (The United States, 
western civilization etc.) is that the norms concerning ideas such as good and bad, moral and 
immoral, have largely been passed down historically. This does not mean, at least in societies 
that Popper termed “open” , that debate and deliberation does not go on concerning these 114
ideas, or that such factors as fragility do not abound. Rather, it means that, by and large, the 
114 See, Popper, Karl. (1945). “The Open Society and its Enemies”. Routledge. 
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nature of what is “moral” has entered the realm of public common sense, and has largely been 
intertwined with the nature of practicable consequences.  
 
Western notions of what was “moral” had moved through history - changing and 
being altered to fit particular circumstances, and some remaining the same - from the ancient 
Greeks and Romans, to the scholastics, through to the European enlightenment, and to us 
today. Don’t kill people; do not steal; care *somewhat* about your neighbors. 
 
 The milieu Addams found herself during the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
century, when she was most active, was dominated by this historical contingency. She was a 
member of this community called “the west”, and this community had come to agree, mostly 
with good reason derived from experience, that there were some states and conditions in the 
world that were “good”, and some that were “bad” - and therefore could, or needed to, be 
ameliorated. 
 
 In advocating for the three R’s then, Addams was in part influenced by these 
historical contingencies - that there was some things we agreed to be bad or good due to 
practicable consequences witnessed through historical experiences. Mass poverty was bad 
and had bad practicable consequences; feeding people who did not have food was good and 
had good practicable consequences. We were social beings steeped in history, and Addams 
acknowledged that. 
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On the other part, Addams was influenced by a pragmatist insistence on continued 
experimentation, on the rejection of dogma. We had received a lot from history; but times 
changed, and what provided the most preferred practicable consequences then, did not 
necessarily do so now. Or the “us”, the community, affected by the consequences of some 
action, had changed and/or broadened, and thus required that we re-evaluate our ideas 
concerning what the best practicable consequences were - and for whom.  
 
Agreements deriving from history thus had to be constantly questioned. Addams 
balanced these two perspectives in her work. She was at once a prominent public intellectual 
who debated the nature and value of our ideas concerning citizenship, gender equality, social 
justice; and she was also a dedicated reformer who wrote books, lobbied, provided food and 
counselling, to implement those things, as a public, we agreed were good, and to do away 
with those we agreed were bad.  
 
Her idea of community then, involved advancing these conceptions of good, and 
doing away with those of bad, while constantly questioning what these terms meant within 
our own historical and cultural contingencies. We had good reason to think that white 
nationalists represented “bad”. And so for Addams, the three R’s were not neutral of value; 
they were guidelines for communities in their attempts at moral progress, and moral progress 
was defined, in the pragmatist way, as ever expanding solidarity based on agreed upon 
practicable consequences. 
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Rorty explained this idea of “ever expanding solidarity” best . Rorty thought that 115
there were two frameworks which human beings, in an attempt to situate the “meaning” of 
their individual existences within a wider world, relied on. The first one was, as discussed in 
detail in sections above, objectivity - what philosophy had relied on since Plato. It involved 
reference to a “non-human reality”, one entirely divorced of community, and accessible to 
everyone so long as they possessed the necessary tools to access it (which, funnily for all its 
allusions about truth and permanence, had changed through time - and once included divine 
selection, but essentially, after the enlightenment, involved sensation, logic and reason). 
Rorty called the believers of objectivity “realists”.  Realists believe(d) that “truth” - an 
immaterial category which corresponded with reality- was to be pursued for its own sake. 
They believed in a metaphysics which distinguished true from false beliefs, and in 
justificatory procedures not bound by communal attitudes; in procedures which were global 
and natural.  
 
The second way was to appeal to solidarity. It involved an individual “telling the story 
of their identification” to a particular community - as mentioned above: western society, the 
Daughters of the Confederacy, Feminists etc. These were the pragmatists.  
 
Realists sought to reduce solidarity to objectivity; they sought to say that we agreed 
on some things not because we simply agreed due to practicable consequences, but because 
there were some objective, natural, and global facts that compelled us to do so. Pragmatists 
on the other hand, sought to reduce objectivity to solidarity; to say that we were “nothing 
115 Rorty, Richard. (1990). “Solidarity or Objectivity”. Published in Landesman, Charles & Meeks, 
Robin (eds.) (2002). “Philosophical Skepticism”. John Wiley & Sons. Pp. 344 - 360. 
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more than our historical moment”, and that what human progress constituted was not in 
“heading to a place which had been prepared for humanity in advance” (i.e. a ​telos​), but 
rather in the ability for all of “​us​” to “do more interesting things and be more interesting 
people” , and, in the same vein, to expand who “us” was, so these others too could do these 116
interesting things and be these interesting people. 
 
 My aim in this part of the essay therefore is to provide a way that we could put 
forward the idea of moral progress -as Addams saw it with her three R’s- and human 
responsibility to the broadest sense of what could be considered “us” - the notion of an 
ever-broadening community, as Rorty outlined it, without grounding these in external 
metaphysical and/or epistemological foundations which either ring hollow and do not provide 
much basis for practicable action (e.g. telling a racist who already believed that he was better 
than a black person, that he was objectively wrong, and expecting the racist, due to this 
argument from objectivity, to then fundamentally alter his views and interactions with black 
people), or are relativistic enough - and therefore so arbitrary, that they make meliorism 
impossible in the world. 
 
In the Addams and Dewey inspired view of community that I am presenting in this 
third part of the essay then, our task of confronting the sorts of problems effective altruism 
involves itself with lies in continually expanding the boundaries of who our “community” is - 
Addams; first R, and then in applying Addams’ two other R’s in our meliorating work. We 
form community when we stop cleaving to notions of objectivity. We then fundamentally 
116 Ibid 115, pg 352. 
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change the ways we interact with others, both from our own intellectual and cultural 
traditions, as well as from other backgrounds. When we conceive of (human) progress within 
such a framework of solidarity; when democratic dialogue aimed at achieving solidarity 
replaces quests for objectivity, then we stop being directed by a teleological place, or ideal 
e.g. QALYs.  
 
Instead we start to think of practicable results affecting members of our (ever 
expanding) community as the basis for social action, action based on the the other two Rs - 
research and reform. If we think of the values we share as members of a community as 
having no external foundations except “​shared social hope and the trust created by such 
sharing​” , then our recourse is to reconfigure our actions so that, in the globalized 117
interconnected world we live in, where actions in one part of the globe affect others, we 
reorient ourselves so that our task becomes figuring out how we can intentionally ​include​ (not 
recognize) those others as members of our ever broadening community , and then in 118
conducting research and enacting reforms which reflect this solidarity. 
 
This notion of shared hope is grounded in experiences we are capable of having as 
beings of particular biological kinds - relating to pain, pleasure, shared - and ever broadening- 
117 Ibid 115 
 
118 This is the reason why Dewey and Rorty were so keen on promoting liberalism. Both believed that 
care - or friendship - could not be called upon spontaneously, as an intellectual demand. Rather, care 
was cultivated by community. Yet it seemed implausible to think that one would think of every human 
being - let alone every human being and animal, as part of one’s communities. Liberalism, they 
thought, got around this, because a liberal community is defined necessarily by its openness to 
others. When I declare myself a liberal qua Rorty or Dewey - or even Mill, I am saying that what 
defines me is my toleration towards others and their ways of life (within the bounds of the harm 
principle) - by definition, my bearing is open and welcoming to difference - and this is how Rorty 
thought we could have an ever expanding community that we could attain solidarity with. 
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understandings of humiliation etc (and thus this may broaden to include concerns about 
animal welfare as well). The pragmatist yields to the fact that we are beings of particular 
biological kinds, but, unlike the realist, he does not think that that tells us anything about 
how, gives us reason why, we ought to be treated in particular ways, or what obligations we 
are owed. “You have a heart or a mind” is not providing a reason as to why I shouldn’t stab 
you. 
 
Animals, possessed of similar biological capacities for pain as we humans, are, for 
example, killed and mistreated everyday, and many people do not concern themselves much 
with this, because we lack solidarity about what this means for ​our​ community. When those 
of us who advocate that animals be not treated in such ways ground our reasons for doing so 
on objectivity, then, as Rorty says, “ we leave ourselves open to the pointlessly skeptical 
question "Is this solidarity real?" For some people will simply say, “I am not, objectively, like 
these animals in these various ways”, or they will say that such a connection is trivial, and so 
they do no see how this argument grounds a sense of obligation. The consequence then is that 
“we leave ourselves open to Nietzsche's insinuation that the end of religion and metaphysics 
should mean the end of our attempts not to be cruel.”   119
 
On the other hand, a grounding on solidarity invites us to not have this Nietzschean 
insinuation, for, from the outset, we do not operate with the notion of “realness” or of 
objective likeness. Having solidarity as our grounding is to detail the experiences we have 
had regarding these shared biological capacities - pain, pleasure, humiliation, and then 
119 Rorty, CIS, Pg. 134 
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making conscious attempts to include others so that they share in the good practicable 
outcomes, and avoid the bad ones. We have no non-circular ways to justify the values we 
hold to be good - freedom of speech and toleration, the capability to love whoever one 
chooses. We have no criterion except a detailing of the practicable consequences we have 
seen occur, through history, when those values have been put in place, and an attempt to 
convince others that these sorts of consequences are what are preferable. 
 
My task here is therefore twofold: It is first to provide a basis for solidarity, for the 
kind of global community which can stand in proxy for Addams’ first R. It is then, after that, 
to show how this community might come together to achieve the other two R’s - research and 
reform; how once we start thinking of other beings in various parts of the world as 
constituting “us”, we can embark on a program of meliorism that is grounded in experience 
and actual consequences, and that is not imposed but takes heed of democratic sentiment. 
 
What is the proxy for the First R then? 
 
Essentialism?… of some sort? 
 
In this attempt to create a wider community, perhaps positing social hope, like I did 
above, as the basis for solidarity brings questions of its own. The challenge here comes from 
both the objectivists and the relativists. On the one hand, the objectivist wants to ask, isn’t 
social hope just another proxy for something more objective, something like utility, that can 
be measured and represented using QALYs?  
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On the flip side, the relativists asks, why is social hope not just another arbitrary 
categorization of what we (pragmatists) deem important as what defines our shared 
community, and if so, what grounding does it have such that we should prefer it over other 
arbitrary categorizations? Which is to say, why is social hope not as good as, or as bad as, 
any other reason for justification? Why can’t the fact that ​we​ all have noses (the “we” here 
being any being that possesses a nose), instead of the idea that we share social hope (based on 
similar biological experiences relating to pain, pleasure and humiliation), be the metric under 
which we form a community, and all unite to derive a sense of obligation to other beings? 
And if it is this arbitrary, why don’t we then acknowledge that every way to live life is as 
good as the other, and thus abandon the notion of trying to fit everyone into some program, 
instead letting every community live as they please, constructing their own cultural 
conceptions of meaning?  
 
These two challenges are ones that the pragmatist wishes to avoid. She wants to 
avoid, on the one hand, a supposedly objective, purely essentialist, conception of human 
functioning that is so teleogized as to present us with the problems outlined in part two of this 
essay. She rightly thinks these conceptions are wrong, for they are reductive in their attempts 
at finding out that one thing - or set of things - that matter in human life - and then ordering 
human action relative to them. She wants to avoid a situation where we take our cultural 
position on some issue and impose it upon others as the objective, correct one, ​based on its 
supposed correspondence to a certain reality​. She thinks that such a program ignores 
May 2018, Wolf Humanities Center Undergraduate Research Fellowship 
John Aggrey Odera, College of Arts & Sciences, 2019, University of Pennsylvania 
81 
 
democratic experience that is essential to achieving the preferable practicable consequences 
she seeks. 
 
On the other hand, she also wants to avoid the relativism that Bhimrao Ambedkar 
called the “placid view of the anthropologist” - that “there is nothing to be said about the 
beliefs, habits, morals and outlooks on life which obtain among the different peoples of the 
world, except that they often differ” . She wants to avoid these sorts of relativistic 120
conceptions because she thinks that they do not provide grounds for practicable action: how 
do we do anything in the world if every point of view, every course of action, is the same as 
the other? The defeatism of these relativistic views does not augur well with the meliorism 
inherent in pragmatism.  
 
Pragmatists want to say that there is such a thing as making the world better. They 
only insist that “better” is a standard of democratic agreement about the value of shared 
experience- not an objective fact nor an arbitrary standard.  
 
In one attempt at tackling this issue, Martha Nussbaum  puts forth a most eloquent 121
(non-pragmatist) conception of the human good; one which avoids both metaphysical realist 
essentialism, and relativism . Kant, Nussbaum thinks, struck the first nail in the coffin of 122
120 Ambedkar, Bhimrao. (2016). “Annihilation of Caste”. Pg. 312. Verso Books. 
121 Here again, as with Bernard Williams in the previous section, it is essential to note that Nussbaum 
is an Aristotelian, not a pragmatist. Whenever there is a conflict between her views and those of the 
pragmatists, I will be sure to point it out. 
 
122 Nussbaum, Martha. (1992). “Human Functioning and Social Justice: In Defense of Aristotelian 
Essentialism”.  Political Theory, Vol. 20, No. 2 (May, 1992), pp. 202-246. 
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metaphysical realism (the kind espoused by the objectivists), and 20th century philosophers 
of language and science such as Wittgenstein, W.V.O. Quine, Donald Davidson, and Nelson 
Goodman, shut and buried that coffin . These philosophers all argued, convincingly, 123
Nussbaum thinks, that the only defensible conceptions of truth and knowledge bound these 
two notions inextricably with human cognitive activity within history. An attempt to provide 
an unmediated essential account outside human cognition within history therefore, these 
philosophers argued, was an absurd attempt that achieved nothing. “To cling to it (such an 
account of essence) as a goal”, Nussbaum, in words very reflective of those of Bernard 
Williams, holds, “is to pretend that it is possible to be told from outside what to be and what 
to do, when in reality the only answers we can ever hope to have must come, in some 
manner, from ourselves” . 124
 
But Nussbaum’s greatest contention is with the relativists - most typified by French 
academics enamoured by Derrida’s assault on the “metaphysics of presence” .  These 125
relativists hearken back to Ambedkar’s placid view of the anthropologist. They would 
123 In “Antwort der Frage, was ist der Aufklaerung”, as well as in his other more prominent works. 
124 Ibid 117. Pg. 207. 
 
125 Derrida thought that philosophy, from Plato onwards, had fallen too far into the clutches of 
metaphysics - a metaphysics which created a dualistic opposition - and privileged one part of this 
duality over another, the common example being presence over absence. Here, Derrida borrows 
heavily from Heidegger, who in ​Being and Time (1927) ​argued that we understood the beings of 
entities - think time, beauty, etc. with respect to a definite mode of time - the present. Heidegger 
thought that we has shifted our attention to the study of particular beings, thus avoiding the ontological 
question of being itself - what is being? What does it mean to be? The result is that we forget to pay 
attention to what brought the present about - to the absent. In ​Speech and Phenomena​, Derrida 
contends that the present is always compromised by a residue of previous experience - a residue that 
can never allow us to be in a self-contained “now” moment. The recourse is that there can never be a 
definite meaning to anything: anytime we try to pin down what something means in itself, the meaning 
slips us in the now. In the context of the discussion above on relativism, what the French relativists do 
is make use of Derrida’s metaphysics of presence to reject any sort of essentialism: whenever we try 
to pin down anything as essential, they think, we are merely privileging the now, the present,, the 
culturally closer, over the then, the absent, the far. 
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contend, Nussbaum argues, that the introduction of the smallpox vaccine in India was a bad 
thing, a case of western contamination of Indian values - for the introduction of this vaccine 
apparently led to the eradication of the cult of Srilata Devi (even though the vaccine saved 
millions of lives - but that’s a moot point).  
 
And these relativists would contend, that India, unlike the west, experiences an 
“embedded way of life” - where the same values that prevail at home prevail in the 
workplace, and that this embedded way of life should not be disturbed by the imposition of 
those dirty western values. An example of this embedded life that Nussbaum provides: A 
menstruating woman is not allowed in the kitchen because she is believed to pollute it. So 
too, in the workplace, where the looms are kept, she is not allowed in, because she is believed 
to pollute the looms. What consistency. 
 
Nussbaum rightly points out that these relativist accounts are repellent; the examples 
they provide are abominable rather than admirable. In their attempts at radical relativism, 
they end up justifying practices and consequences we have very good reason to find 
detestable. Nussbaum proposes, in response, what she terms an “internalist essentialism” . 126
By this, she means, we could well reject metaphysical realism but still be left with a 
somewhat​ essentialist account of human life, one deriving from understandings of human 
history and biology.  
 
126 An earlier, similar idea, the “internalist conception of Philosophy”, concerning knowledge grounded 
not metaphysically but experientially, had been put forth by Hilary Putnam in his ​Reason,Truth and 
History (1981​). 
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She thinks that we can say that the ability to choose and act is more fundamental to, 
and more reflective of, a human life, than, say, the ability to earn $60,000. She thinks that we 
should privilege saving human lives over advancing the cult of Srilata Devi. She thinks that 
we are rarely ever in doubt when we encounter another human being - and this is for very 
precise reasons: because our understandings of history and biology (which are not 
metaphysically but experientially grounded) have provided us with some sort of essentialist 
account of what it means to be a human being, and what it means not to be one . 127
 
Even though pragmatists do not hold an essentialism of any kind , Nussbaum’s 128
account, in many ways, gets to the very heart of what I termed above as pragmatist social 
hope (as Rorty called it) or social efficiency (as Dewey called it). Rorty sought to ground his 
views about social hope as the basis for creating community on accounts of avoidance of 
cruelty - with regards to biological capacities relating to pain and pleasure, and on historically 
contingent factors such as cultural humiliation.  
 
127 This idea of recognizing other human beings as human beings, or, say, a dog recognizing another 
dog, was first stated by Franklin Henry Giddings in his 1896 work, ​The Principles of Sociology​. 
Giddings called this “consciousness of kind”, which he defined as “a state of consciousness in which 
any being, whether high or low in the scale of life, recognizes another conscious being as of like kind 
with itself”. See 2004 edition, pg. 17 (Cosmo Publications). 
 
128 We agree with Nussbaum, but refuse to categorize this as essentialism - arguing that it is only a 
case where we have studied consequences and causal relations of particular kinds in particular 
situations at particular times, and are moved to action due to some kind of agreement on desirable 
consequences. 
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 For Dewey, social efficiency was propped by conceptions of freedom. It meant that 129
the individual was afforded the capacities to choose and develop her competencies, and from 
this, to engage critically with, and to contribute meaningfully to, the functioning of her 
society - broadly construed. Dewey’s pragmatic ethics were fundamentally grounded on 
experience. He thought that what ethical inquiry constituted in was the use of reflective 
intelligence to improve our judgements - and this only came about ​after​ acting on those 
judgements, not ​a priori​. Moral progress, for Dewey, came about when, upon reflection, we 
revised our judgements to cohere with the preferable practicable consequences for the 
broadest range of people affected by them - and this was our community.  
 
We have seen people die from smallpox, and from lack of food and water - and this 
relates to capacities they possess biologically. We have not, so far as I can tell, seen people 
die because they can no longer worship Srilata Devi or Zeus or Jesus Christ. We have, 
further, seen the humiliation - irrespective of cultural contexts, and assaults on freedom, that 
women all over the world suffer, due to various cultural practices and systemic frameworks; 
how they have been denied the freedom to self-determine. We have seen that their conditions 
do not represent the best practicable consequences for them - for when afforded choices to 
alter these consequences, they have taken them. We seek, as pragmatists interested in 
meliorism, to pursue moral progress by helping them attain the capacities to choose what to 
do with their lives. In this sense, we aim to think of them as members of our community.  
 
129 The term was first introduced into academic parlance by Benjamin Kidd in his 1884 book, “Social 
Evolution”. Kidd was a social Darwinist - and the consequences of his school of thought are largely 
abominable to most of us right now. When Dewey took up the term, he sought to imbue it with a 
humanism. Relating especially to his views on education, Dewey made “social efficiency” a good and 
humanistic value to aspire to. 
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But just like we have genuine differences about some issues even within our liberal 
community, these differences exist too with these other members of our created community. 
And just like, within the bounds of some harm principle, we do not force members of our 
liberal community to do things they do not wish to, and instead seek to persuade them, so too, 
with these members of our created community, we do not force upon them the choices we 
ourselves think are good; we only present them with the capacity to choose. They are free, if 
they so wish, to, in our view, waste those choices - to reject the smallpox vaccine and 
continue worshiping Srilata Devi. So long as they have that choice to “waste”, and so long as 
they are reasonably informed about the practicable consequences of whatever course of 
action they decide to take. 
 
This gets us to Addams’ second R - research. The essence of this Deweyan notion of 
reflective intelligence and social efficiency is not applicable only in creating a framework for 
solidarity, but also in outlining what orientation this community then takes when it makes 
decisions concerning practicable outcomes.  When we conduct scientific experiments, we 
hypothesize, and then test to see weather the results confirm the hypotheses. So too, with 
value judgements, putting them into practice and seeing whether we like the consequences in 
the ways the judgement predicted, is the only way of confirming or disconfirming them (i.e. 
making a habit of repeating or not repeating the same action) until we have further 
experience. Nussbaum would like to call the tested judgements we have come to have so far 
essential; we agree with her in practice, but because pragmatists are skeptics, we leave room 
for doubt - for the possibility that the world may yet provide us with information that alters 
our conceptions. 
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 For Dewey then, in conducting Addams’ research about what presents the best 
practicable outcomes, we must remember that though intelligent value judgements proceed 
from this logic of experimentation, they involve more than just this sort of experimenting to 
see if we value the consequences. For a clearer picture of the limits of experimentation only, 
imagine how it would look like if we all took to tasting any foreign looking objects to see if 
they could kill us!  
 
Intelligent value judgements consist, rather, in drawing analogous judgements 
concerning potential consequences between novel scenarios and past experiences. It involves 
constantly incorporating these new consequences into the wider framework of what we 
consider “experience”, such that the next time we have a novel scenario, the consequences of 
the judgements we made in past scenarios affect how we look at the new one.  
 
The result of this is that we come to have some sort of provisional knowledge about 
what to do and what not to do, based on the consequences of doing or not doing those things; 
a knowledge based entirely on experience and intelligent judgement as opposed to an 
essentialist account of any sort, and therefore a knowledge that could always potentially 
change based on future experience. We refuse to say that any question is settled; but we think 
we have good reason to act in certain ways in order to attain certain consequences we think to 
be good. This is the essence of contingency.  
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So while Nussbaum’s internalist essentialist account gets to similar points as what we 
pragmatists believe, unlike Nussbaum, in speaking about amelioration, we refuse to provide a 
list of criterion, even a very vague, fungible one, of what makes a human life worth living; or 
regarding what exact conditions we think need to obtain for a life to be considered “well 
lived”. We pragmatists, in advocating for the spreading of the values ​we​ champion - values 
that we think meliorate, resort to the unsatisfying tactic of stating Mill’s example about 
Haydn and the oyster , we simply describe our experience - “this is what we do” - and then 130
invite comparison.  
 
We say that our (liberal) values are experientially grounded on “comparisons between 
societies which exemplify these habits and those which do not, leading up to the suggestion 
that nobody who has experienced both would prefer the latter​” . ​We insist that experience 131
has shown us that with regards to pain, pleasure and humiliation, the consequences of some 
actions have been preferable, and the consequences of some not so- or if at all, for very few 
of us.  
 
This is to say, that fewer children who are vaccinated die from childhood diseases 
than children who are not vaccinated; that those who eat usually live, and those who do not 
130 In this example, very well outlined by Roger Crisp in his book, ​Mill on Utilitarianism (1997)​, one is 
offered the choice of living the life of Joseph Haydn- a wonderful composer, traveller, man of letters - 
basically someone who lived, in our conception, a rich and fulfilling life - but only for seventy seven 
years. Or one is offered the life of a lobster, consisting of “only mild sensual pleasure, rather like that 
experienced by humans when floating very drunk in a warm bath” - but for a million years. The idea is 
that most human beings would choose Haydn’s lie over that of the lobsters, for having experienced 
the “higher pleasures” which Haydn experienced, and the “lower pleasures” which we suppose the 
lobster experiences, we could not but choose Haydn’s life. So too, we pragmatists want to say that 
anyone who has lived in a society which promotes toleration and freedom of speech, and in a society 
which does not do so, will, if given the choice, choose the one that promotes these values. 
 
131 Ibid 113, pg 356 
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eat usually die - and that life is a preferable consequence as compared to death. When faced 
with situations requiring action, the pragmatist grounds her conduct on an intelligent 
appraisal of these consequences, and chooses the course of action with the most preferable 
consequences for the broadest range of people, if she already knows what that is, or she seeks 
agreement on what this preferable consequence might be if she does not already know. This 
is both the basis for our notion of shared community which we seek to expand as widely as 
possible, as well as the framework for research regarding what we think meliorates 
 
 
 
Making Space for Democracy 
 
With this conception of anti-essentialism in mind, I now turn to the interaction of 
democracy and beneficence in pragmatist ethics in tackling that third R: Reform 
 
A rejection of these sorts of essentialism leaves us pragmatists at a sort of halfway 
house in the kind of work the effective altruists are engaged in. On the one hand, we think 
that, as regards those things which experience and research has so far shown to be necessary 
for the continued existence of human beings and animals (we think existence is good) - based 
on their status as beings of particular biological kinds - we have good reason to desire these 
things, and we think beings similar to us in these biological facticities also have good reason 
to desire these things (and to shun the converse of these things).  
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This is the (circular) intertwining of the first two R’s: We have created a notion of 
community based around these commonalities regarding pain, pleasure and humiliation, and 
from this notion of community, we have this shared understanding of common experience, of 
what results are preferable, to whom among us, and what results are not - this constitutes our 
“research”. 
 
So we think - when it comes to the third R - reform, as the effective altruists do, for 
example, that animals should not be subjected to pain and torture, and to all the other kinds of 
malaise that comes with such things as factory farming, and we work collectively to convince 
others about this, and to realize the consequences we hope for. We think that human beings 
should have access to things such as food and shelter and medical care, and we think think 
that they should have similar freedoms as those we have in our liberal community. On the 
basis, grounded from our other two R’s - the notion of community deriving from intelligent 
understanding of and research on shared experience, we seek to realize these practical goals. 
 
In our activity concerning reform, we extend our understanding of ourselves based on 
these biological facilities to others who share them too. And we think that based on these 
biological commonalities, these others also have reason to desire the things that we do, due to 
our shared possession of these facilities. But we do not hold that there is such a thing as an 
inherent moral obligation, one from outside, grounding our beliefs; such a thing as a one to 
one mapping between our beliefs and reality that demands things from us. We think, that if 
any meaningful action is to occur concerning these things, that we need to convince people to 
believe as we do about these things, and the only way to do so is not by asserting objectivity, 
May 2018, Wolf Humanities Center Undergraduate Research Fellowship 
John Aggrey Odera, College of Arts & Sciences, 2019, University of Pennsylvania 
91 
 
but by describing our position in the best ways possible; by giving reasons why we consider it 
good, and then providing the option that each of ​us​ might chose what strikes them as 
providing the best practicable consequences.  
 
On the other hand, we recognize our ethnocentrism, such that even though we think 
we have good reason to deem some things good because of their consequences to us, we 
recognize that for various reasons - historical and cultural contingencies, for example, other 
people and other cultures might not value the things that we value, or to the same extents. We 
thus realize that we cannot impose anything. We understand that any engagements with these 
other people, in the hope of changing their minds - or ours - so as to produce the best 
preferable outcomes, is going to involve reason giving and receiving. We are open, as 
pragmatists interested in social melioration, and as skeptics, to be transformed by the 
reasoned conversations we have with others, just as much as we hope that they too retain 
some pliability within their convictions; a pliability which might enable potential 
transformation on their part.  
 
The result of this is state of continued discussion mediated by democratic experience. 
We understand that even in the process of beneficence and reform, we cannot divorce what 
we think is important, from what others, most importantly those who are the targets of our 
beneficence, think is important. 
 
Let us turn to “the fats”, as William James put it. How would this possibly look like in 
practice? 
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Part of the challenge of my project here - which means it can never be as neat as a 
typical philosophical theory, is that trying to put forth a pragmatist theory (of anything) 
constitutes a paradox. Pragmatists are contextualists; they do not think it is possible to state 
an overarching theory of anything. Dewey says, “The standard of success for value 
judgements is developed internally to the practice at hand, relative to the people’s 
descriptions of their problems” . Dewey thought that there was no way we could have 132
standards of valuation that were external to context and practice, and that were unbound from 
learning gained through trial and error, and then extended to intelligent judgement.  
 
But perhaps for a clearer understanding of exemplums of how I think pragmatist 
democracy, as a hazy school of thought, may instantiate Addam’s third R; may deal with the 
problems we currently face, it would be better to look at specific cases. 
 
 There were three main problems that I pointed out in the second section of this essay, 
three main things I thought were wrong with effective altruism. These were 1.) Effective 
Altruism’s reliance on “moral experts”, and therefore cultivation of moral imbeciles, 2.) 
Effective altruism’s lack of engagement with meaningful structural reform, and its heavy 
reliance on “the markets”, despite the well-documented role of the markets in causing 
deprivation, and 3.) What I called the “Bernard Williams critique”: the idea that Effective 
Altruism’s deep emphasis on maximization, a supposedly objective moral imperative that 
abstracts from our lives, presents a philosophy that simply asks too much from us, and leaves 
132 Dewey, John. (1922). Human Nature and Conduct. Pg. 208. 
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us very vulnerable to that Nietzschean question: Is this solidarity real? And thus to a relativist 
rejection of any notion of moral progress.  
 
Here, I will briefly explore how pragmatism deals with the first two of these very 
particular examples ( I believe Bernard Williams said everything that was there to be said 
concerning the third critique, and that his position was not one that the pragmatists would 
disagree with). 
 
On Moral Experts and Imbeciles 
 
Deweyan Pragmatism’s insistence on radical democracy as necessary for reform 
automatically precludes the notion of “moral experts”, and all the pernicious consequences 
that come with them. Dewey’s views on radical democracy were influenced, to a very large 
extent, by Charles Sanders Peirce . Declared the “founder” of pragmatism by William James, 
Peirce was a brilliant logician, mathematician and philosopher who was also, early on in his 
life, an undemocratic racist . 133
 
 In one of the earliest pieces of writing to be considered “Pragmatist” philosophy,  134
Peirce laid out four methods he thought people came to ground their beliefs. The first one 
was the method of tenacity - whereby one, by repeating something to themselves, by saying it 
133 A funny anecdote: Peirce, influenced by his brilliant and racist father, Benjamin Peirce - perhaps 
the greatest American Mathematician of his generation, so rejected the equality of ‘negroes’ that he 
took the syllogism “All men have equal political rights, negroes are men, therefore negroes are equal 
in political rights to white people” to be indicative of a failure in traditional logic. 
 
134 Peirce, Charles Sanders. (1877). The Fixation of Belief. Popular Science Monthly, 12. Pg. 1-15. 
 
May 2018, Wolf Humanities Center Undergraduate Research Fellowship 
John Aggrey Odera, College of Arts & Sciences, 2019, University of Pennsylvania 
94 
 
until they themselves bought it, came to believe whatever it was they were saying. This was 
the essence of Lyndon Johnson’s phrase “what convinces is conviction” . Peirce thought 135
this method unsustainable, the “social impulse” was against it; for if we encountered other 
people who believed differently and just as strongly, then our confidence in our own beliefs 
would be shaken.  
 
The second method was that of authority - where there was an authority that provided 
ideas about what to believe, and policed how people went about doing this; a chief means of 
upholding certain “theological and political” doctrines - the church, the king. While this 
method could be accompanied by immense cruelty (cue in the crusades, colonialism, etc) 
Peirce thought it was by far superior to the method of tenacity. Peirce, ever the elitist, 
believed that the method of authority was sufficient for most human beings, but insufficient 
for the more brilliant minds. It was also flawed, for no institution could hoppe to regulate 
opinions on everything.  
 
The third method was the ​a priori​ method, most exemplified by “metaphysical 
philosophy”, where systems of belief were adopted not in reference to “facts”, but, as with 
my criticisms of effective altruism and broader teleological and deontological philosophy 
above, because “their fundamental propositions seemed ‘agreeable to reason’”. Peirce 
contended that this was the most intellectual method (of the three so far discussed), but its 
failing was that we had to resort to the metaphysicians view of what this unifying, 
overarching reason was, and even the metaphysicians themselves disagreed on this. 
135 See, Caro, Robert, A. (1990).. The Years of Lyndon Johnson, Volume 2: Means of Ascent. Pimlico 
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Knowledge, by this conception, Peirce thought, became a matter of taste - that of the 
metaphysical authority. In his view, we were free to continue to believe in the supremacy of 
this uninvolved reason until we are awakened with “rough facts”. 
 
 Finally, Peirce laid out what he termed the Scientific method, one that constituted a 
matching of contingent fact and opinion - and a willingness to change opinion when 
confronted with negating facts - to adopt a new contingency so as to better deal with life. This 
method championed constant and conscious reflection and doubt, and a rejection of authority, 
tenacity or ​apriorism​. It insisted that belief could not be permanently “fixated”, but that it 
was possible to engage intelligently with both our contingent beliefs concerning the world, 
and the brute facts that the world continued presenting to us, requiring us to substitute these 
beliefs for new ones when prompted to do so. 
 
 Dewey was not unconvinced by Peirce’s typology. But unlike Peirce and his 
misanthropy, Dewey refused to believe that the method of authority was sufficient for most 
of humanity. Dewey’s radical rejection of teleology led to a deep and abiding charity to, and 
respectful consideration of, the views of everyone who was potentially affected by an issue , 136
a charity that sometimes seemed to verge on the ​naïve​. Indeed, Dewey, together with Tolstoy 
136 Dewey’s book was part of a sustained conversation with the famous public intellectual Walter 
Lippmann (Credited with introducing the terms “Cold war” and “stereotype”). In his two books, ​Public 
Opinion ​(1922) and ​The Phantom Public​ (1925), Lippmann ​argued for a technocratic elite as best 
placed to serve the public interest. Lippmann recognized the stakes that “the public” held in political 
life, he simply argued that they (the public) lacked specialized knowledge, were too ill suited to 
exercise political power. Their desires were too uncoordinated and un thought out, and if let to reign 
free, would spell doom for society. 
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and Rousseau, is the most prominent modern thinker who respected the intelligence of the 
common man without irony. 
 In his 1927 work , Dewey presented his pragmatist conception of democracy as the 137
most viable means of achieving a public interest. In his later work , Dewey expounded on 138
this, construing democracy as a continuous project, a “way of life and an experience built on 
faith in human nature, faith in human beings, and faith in working with others” .  139
 
Dewey’s idea was not, as Walter Lippmann, his fiery interlocutor, feared: that an 
involvement of the public in public affairs would lead to a case where we had millions of 
points of views put across concerning the public good, many of them competing and 
conflicting, some of them downright mediocre, therefore leading to an inability to do 
anything. On the contrary, Dewey thought that, yes, these ideas ought to and would be put 
forward, but he did not believe that doing this would derail progress or action. If anything, he 
thought it would sharpen our ideas concerning what was contingently good, and produce 
better consequences. The town hall, as I mentioned at the beginning of this third section, was 
the hallmark of Deweyan democratic life, and the idea was that this was where public 
engagement occured.  
 
Public engagement leading to reform, for Dewey, involved primarily reason giving 
and reason asking. One person put forth their point of view, gave reasons as to why they 
137 Dewey, John. (1927). The Public and its Problems. Henry Holt. 
 
138 Dewey, John. (1939). Creative Democracy: The Task Before Us.  
 
139 Kadlec, Alison. (2007). Dewey’s Critical Pragmatism. Lexington Books. Pg. 125. 
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thought this point of view presented the best consequences for the public. The rest of us 
debated this, giving reasons - based on some form of research, as to why we thought it 
preferable or not; proposing alternate, sometimes contrary, points of view; and engaging in 
debates concerning these too. The search was for an agreement concerning a course of 
actionable reform regarding the issue at hand, and sometimes these agreements would not be 
easy to come by. When this happened, Dewey thought the process of deliberation even more 
necessary at such times. 
 
In our increasingly globalized times, our task is to extend the concept of the town hall 
(i.e. community) to the interwebs, to blogs and online forums and books and radio and tv 
shows; to the decision-making chambers of global organizations, and to any ways that we 
have to communicate with each other; any ways that seeks to engage with pertinent issues 
concerning shared consequences that we suffer as a (global) public - think, climate change, 
threats from AI, disease, hunger, immigration etc.  
 
Some, like Lippmann, seeing this democratic attempt at reform, would characterize it 
as the “invasion of the idiots” ; they would view it as an exemplum of how, in 140
democratizing forums of discourse, our public discourse deteriorates, and how due to this 
deterioration in discourse, practical action in the world is the worse for it. They would 
140 Quote from Umberto Eco. The quote in Full: “Social media gives legions of idiots the right to speak 
when they once only spoke at a bar after a glass of wine, without harming the community. Then they 
were quickly silenced, but now they have the same right to speak as a Nobel Prize Winner. It is the 
invasion of the idiots… The drama of the internet is that it has promoted the village idiot to the bearer 
of truth”. Quote lifted from ​La Stampa Cultura​. ​Umberto Eco: “Con i social parola a legioni di imbecilli”​. 
https://www.lastampa.it/2015/06/10/cultura/eco-con-i-parola-a-legioni-di-imbecilli-XJrvezBN4XOoyo0h
98EfiJ/pagina.html 
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hearken back to Peirce’s description of authority, demanding that we, the public, leave the 
important issues to the experts, who can discuss them dispassionately and expertly. 
 
Dewey, on the other hand, would argue that was wrong was not the democratization 
of discourse, but rather the fact that it was not conducted intelligently or with good faith; that 
it did not efficiently make use of Addams’ other two R’s i.e. that either its conception of 
community was warped - too parochial so as to not take into equal consideration others who 
were also affected by the consequences of some actions, or that it did not involve the giving 
and taking of validly held reasons, and sometimes if it did, that these reasons were held so 
blindly as to not be pliable to the views of others .  141
 
For Dewey, hearkening back to Peirce’s scientific method, even authority (“science”, 
nobel laureates etc.) were to be held to the principle of reason giving and receiving. It was 
only with robust public engagement that any policy put forth, any idea suggested, that 
required the cooperation of the public to be implemented, could move forward.  
 
Yet even within this public proliferation of ideas, Dewey did not think that all ideas 
had equal merit. He thought that we could intelligently evaluate the practical consequences of 
some of them, and provisionally reject them, and that we could provisionally adopt those 
141 In fact Dewey thought that experts were much more at risk of such a scenario of unpliability than 
the public was. ​In Human Nature and Conduct​, Dewey wrote of how the various intersecting habits 
and impulses of various communities and individuals in democratic societies affected each other, 
meaning that if individuals and communities had any hope for survival, their views necessarily had to 
be pliable to reason (here’s Darwin’s influence again). For example, say I strongly believed a certain 
herb to be an appetite enhancer, and others within my community, based on experience, believed it to 
be poisonous. If I was not pliable to their reason-giving, and ended up consuming the herb and thus 
dieing, then that would be it for me. Experts on the other hand, while important, worked necessarily 
from abstraction, and as Peirce pointed out in the criticism of authority, they just could not regulate 
opinions, ways of practice and living in the messiness of real life. 
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which promised preferable consequences. He only insisted, much like John Stuart Mill, that 
these ideas be put out there; he thought, along with Mill, that a democratic basket full of ideas 
presented the best chance for social reconstruction, for the more ideas we had, the greater the 
chance that we would have good ones among them. Good ideas, Dewey thought, were not the 
preserve of experts; we would not leave it to them. 
 
What does this mean in the specific case of beneficence? It means, to begin with, as I 
have been arguing throughout, that under the pragmatist conception, we cannot have, from 
the outset, moral experts declare what is important due to some metric agreed upon by some 
authority, insist on its maximization, or its supremacy, and then impose it on others based on 
this supposed objectivity. It means that in our attempts at reform - Addams’ third R, we have 
no choice but to hearken back to the other two R’s - to create a notion of community due to 
shared experience based on the commonalities I outlined above, and to conduct research on 
this common experience, and what the preferred practicable consequences are for all 
members of that community.  
 
This necessitates that we acknowledge the messiness of the world; that if we have 
ideas that we think are good and that we think merit attention, then our recourse is to 
convince others about the preferable consequences of these ideas giving reasons, and by 
realizing that those reasons might conflict with other validly held reasons. A (now global) 
society that engaged in this activity of reason giving and receiving without resorting to 
teleologies, Dewey thought, constituted a ​public, ​in the best sense of the word, and was best 
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suited to tackle any issues that faced it, avoiding the notions of moral experts - and 
subsequent moral imbeciles. 
 
This meant that when we decided if and where to donate, it was not because it was 
objectively “better” to donate to AI research as opposed to cancer research due to some 
objective moral duty to maximize, but rather because we had intelligently engaged with the 
problems facing us, and decided (or not) to take a particular course of action. It meant that as 
long as our views were pliable to reason, we were bound to have our minds changed 
whenever we encountered it; that as long as we thought of those others as part of “us”, we 
were bound to engage with the problems affecting them, without asserting our own 
categorizations and rankings of those problems, nor an objective metaphysics to ground them.  
 
This does not leave us at a neat place, with all the numbers crunched and the precise 
courses of action outlined; but it leaves us at an honest place. We pragmatists cannot say 
whether AI research is more important than Malaria research - we do not think such a ranking 
of such disparate things affecting different people in different ways is possible - for there is 
no teleology to ground them. But we think both are problems. The pragmatist view then is 
that of seeking solidarity to attempt to tackle both these problems intelligently. If deliberation 
comes up with the idea of which one of different causes requires the majority of our 
resources, that idea will be subject to potential change, and it will be grounded on our 
agreement as to what issues we deem most pertinent, and how to ensure that those members 
of our public affected by other issues, and who also have a say on this issue, are sufficiently 
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cared for. There is no eliminibility here - no one issue being subsumed by another. So long as 
the issue affects our public, we seek to address it. But how to address it? 
 
On Structural Reform 
 
Much of the essence of John Dewey’s pragmatist philosophy was concerned with the 
fact that he thought philosophy had become a discipline that did not engage with life; 
abstracted too much from the “questions of men”, and instead dealt with the questions of 
philosophers - questions which were not of practical use to the values and social conditions of 
everyday life. Dewey set forth to reimagine philosophy; to reconstruct it as a “general theory 
of education” or as a “criticism of criticisms” - an activity that interdependent organisms 
participated in so as to intelligently engage with their environing conditions. This, to be done 
well, required democracy - “a mode of associated living, of conjoint communicated 
experience”  142
 
In this process of engaging with public life so as to promote the ideals of democracy, 
Dewey wore many hats. He was the foremost educational reform advocate in the United 
States; America’s leading public intellectual of the first half of the twentieth century; easily 
the most prominent Pragmatist - perhaps, as a school of thought, America’s greatest (only?) 
original contribution to western philosophy; one of the most prominent psychologists - and 
founders of the field (and still one of the most cited); founder of many organizations, and 
member of many boards, which sought to engage with public life - for example, the 
142 Democracy and Education, pg. 93 
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organizations that later became the NAACP , and the ACLU; a prominent supporter of 143
women’s suffrage and the settlement house movement (led by Addams); President of the 
League for Industrial Democracy; Chairman of the Congress for Cultural Freedoms, just to 
name a few.  
 
For the same reasons, Dewey was also actively involved in the plight of intellectuals 
and activists during his time. He edited a volume on the “Bertrand Russell Case” , and, at 144
the influence of his student, Sidney Hook, was head of the eponymous Dewey Commission 
which cleared Leon Trotsky of the accusations against him made by Joseph Stalin  . Dewey 145
was a great admirer of Eugene V. Debs, sympathising with Debs’ views on the Pullman 
Strikes , and, at a time when it was incredibly unfashionable, Dewey declared himself a 146
democratic socialist , strongly advocating for Georgist proposals to tax land values so as to 147
lessen economic inequalities . He was, for most of his adult life, viewed as “dangerously 148
radical”  149
 
143 National Association for the Advancement of Colored People 
 
144 Regarding the prominent British Philosopher, Lord Russell’s denial of permission to teach, and 
demotion from position as Professor, at the City University of New York due to charges that Russell, 
in his works, propagated “indecency” i.e. was an atheist, and advocated for sex before marriage. 
 
145 The Case of Leon Trotsky: Reports of Hearings on the Charges Made Against Him in the Moscow 
Trials … by the Preliminary Commision into the inquiry on the charges made against Trotsky in the 
Moscow Trials. ​https://www.marxists.org/archive/trotsky/1937/dewey/index.htm 
 
146 Encyclopedia Britannica: Pullman Strike. ​https://www.britannica.com/event/Pullman-Strike 
 
147 ​though he fervently refused to associate with the communists,  
 
148 See, Dewey, John (1927). “An Appreciation of Henry George”. From An Introduction to “​Significant 
Paragraphs from Progress and Poverty​”. 
 
149 See, Caspary, William R. (2000). Dewey on Democracy. 
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Here Dewey, I argue, showed to a remarkable extent what an engaged public life, and 
one that was attuned to the works of systems, looked like. Dewey’s core concern which 
marked all his work was, by nature, structural. Social life, he thought, could only be sustained 
when it was conceived of as an organism - and individuals as its constituent parts. If the 
well-being of one part was not taken care of, then the well-being of the organism was 
compromised; to ameliorate the individual part, we would have to ameliorate the organism, 
and vice versa. 
 
 He was thus at once concerned about publics coming together to solve problems that 
affected them collectively, hence his huge role as a public intellectual and as an involved 
actor in tackling social problems; as he was about what he considered “inchoate publics” - 
those publics lacking “​the critical education, time, and attention necessary for inquiry” that 
presentented “democracy with perhaps its most significant and undermining condition”  - 150
those who, for various reasons, some of them market caused, could not participate in public 
“inquiry”. 
 
To tackle  this, Dewey came up with  conception of individualism that he believed 
was humanistic enough to address these broader structural issues. 
 
To begin, Dewey conceived of individual freedom as “a distinctive way of feeling the 
impacts of the world, and of showing a preferential bias in response to these impacts” . But 151
150 Quote original from Dewey in ​The Public and its Problems​, cited here from the entry on Dewey on 
the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. ​https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/dewey/#PoliPhil 
 
151 Dewey, John. (1930). Individualism Old and New. 
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this idea of freedom as making choice possible was social, for the very notion of individuality 
was borne upon, and shaped by, social conditions - there was no individual thriving that 
occured without a social environing that made it possible. Consequently, to attempt to solve 
individual problems without tackling the social conditions that engendered them was a waste 
of time. 
 
Dewey’s politics reflected this. Especially in the 1930s, when the effects of the Great 
Depression ravaged America, Dewey insisted strongly that individuality -in the sense he 
construed it - could only be supported by a socialized economy. To this effect, he strongly 
fought for reforms that he believed advanced this conception: - the strengthening of workers’ 
rights - especially as regards unionization; and the democratization of the workplace, both in 
terms of ownership structures and hierarchy. This, he thought, would provide room for those 
inchoate publics to become part of our deliberation and inquiry. 
 
For all these desired ends, democracy was the means. Dewey could not help but see 
that there was politics to everything; in the family, in the school yard, and yes, in charity. If, 
therefore,charity - or anything really, was to address “the problems of men”, it had to enable 
this concept of individual freedom that Dewey was so taken by . To some extent, this 152
152 In this sense, the Deweyan conception of individual freedom is quite similar to the capabilities 
approach championed by Sen and Nussbaum. The differences, of course, are that Sen’s and 
Nussbaum’s  conceptions do not attach as strongly an importance to the social environment as 
Dewey’s, and, like Sen but unlike Nussbaum, Dewey refuses to provide a list of these freedoms or 
capabilities.  
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required historicizing; research on what the roots of certain social ills were , on the publics 153
affected by said problems, on whether they were “inchoate” or not.  
 
This was why Dewey was so captivated by Addams, whose three R’s perfectly 
typified this notion of structural reform. Residence (community) - from the outset, 
articulating the social nature of the problem; Research - democratic inquiry and deliberation 
into what factors engendered said problems, and into what ways to tackle it; and Reform - the 
communication and implementation of solutions that had been arrived at through a 
democratic process. This, Dewey believed, was the proper framework for approaching 
structural reform; for he thought that it got to the heart of his project: ameliorating the part 
and the whole. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
153 This was best typified by both William James and Dewey who, upon reading DuBois’ (who was 
James’ student at Harvard) ​Souls of Black Folk​, understood the specificities of the case of the African 
American in America, and the necessity of historicism in understanding the practical consequences of 
issues such as systemic racism. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
“Philosophy leaves everything as it is”, Wittgenstein said, in his posthumously 
published​ Investigations . Wittgenstein’s book ushered in the Linguistic turn in philosophy 154
(which Neopragmatists like Rorty greatly made use of), where the role of philosophy, done 
correctly, came to be viewed as descriptive rather than prescriptive - eliminating contingent 
misunderstanding by providing continuous attempts at clarity, rather than detailing norms 
about what was acceptable.  
 
The latter task, Wittgenstein thought, was the work of science, art, religion, politics 
etc. In this framework, philosophy’s task was seen as, by its power to attempt to describe the 
ever changing vagaries of life, clearing the way for those other things to act in the world. 
“What we are destroying is nothing but houses of cards, and we are clearing up the ground of 
language on which they stood” .  155
 
In this sense, American Pragmatism is both philosophical and anti-philosophical. It is 
philosophical in so much as it coheres with Wittgenstein’s description of activity that ​he 
considered “philosophical” - that which clears space without offering non-contingent norms. 
It is anti-philosophical in so far as it flies in the face of what was, since Plato, considered 
proper philosophy - that activity that authoritatively prescribed norms, and ruled over life 
abstractly. The function of philosophies such as pragmatism is to provide therapy for those 
154 Wittgenstein, Ludwig. (1953). Philosophical Investigations (Philosophische Untersuchungen). Pg. 
124. Translated from the German by Elizabeth Anscombe. Wiley-Blackwell; 2009 Edition. 
155 Ibid, Pg. 118. 
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other kinds of philosophies which make absolute claims about reality. The utilitarianism 
typified by Effective Altruism is “philosophical” in the second way (in the sense that 
pragmatism is anti-philosophical) - it offers absolute claims based on objectivity. 
 
This project has been an attempt to look at these two kinds of philosophies (their 
epistemologies, really), and the sort of practical ethics that arise from them, particularly 
regarding meliorism. I have argued that the framework of orientation that undergirds 
pragmatism, by its skepticism and its attunement to context, tragedy, and contingency, 
provides much better grounds for social meliorism. And I have argued that the pernicious 
consequences that I see Effective Altruism as having, in terms of its promotion of moral 
heedlessness, its lack of attention to systemic reform, and its demandingness, are related to its 
status as the kind of objectivity-invoking philosophy which Wittgenstein was referring to. 
 
Our task then, as I have constantly reiterated, is to start hearkening to that first 
question posed by Peirce - What are the practicable consequences of this? - rather than that 
one posed by Plato/ Socrates - What is this? Our beneficent actions, and our notions of moral 
progress, I strongly believe, will be better off for it. 
 
 
 
May 2018, Wolf Humanities Center Undergraduate Research Fellowship 
John Aggrey Odera, College of Arts & Sciences, 2019, University of Pennsylvania 
108 
